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PREAMBLE
Disappearance of Carlos Ignacio Boncio File No. 666
On 25 March 1976 at 9:45 a.m. uniformed personnel of the security forces
raided the premises of the Mestrina shipyard located at the intersection of
Calles Chubut and Rfo Luj n in Tigre, Buenos Aires province, where my
son worked[,] and arrested him in front of his workmates. As soon as he
Habeas Corpus Law in Argentina
was arrested we began formalities to determine his whereabouts, and
shortly afterwards we managed to locate him in Police Station No. 1 in
Tigre. I got some food to him and received a few messages in his hand-
writing: I still have them. Then he was transferred and we lost trace of
him. To this date we still don't know where he is... The habeas corpus
[petition] presented to Dr. Guillermo F. Rivarola at Federal Court No. 3
(No. 39.930) was eventually rejected and the order given to send photo-
copies to the Army High Command so that they could investigate my son's
supposed illegal deprivation of liberty.
On April 5, 1977, Boncio's mother wrote the following letter to the
court dealing with the writ of habeas corpus:
Judge Rivarola. I am an Argentine citizen. My name is Ana Inds Mancebo
de Boncio. I wish to inform you that my son Carlos Ignacio Boncio, L.E.
8,242,272, has not been released. Despite the response to my writ of
habeas corpus, I know for a fact from the people released from Campo
de Mayo that my son is still there. I beseech you, therefore, to use your
good offices to determine why he has not been set free given that his
release had been authorized. Thanldng you in advance for your assistance,
I am, yours sincerely, Ana I.M. Boncio.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of habeas corpus has always been considered one of the founda-
tions of the rule of law of Western civilization. It is the "great writ," the key
to the protection of all other human liberties.2 During the years of military
dictatorship in Argentina, the "great writ" failed.3 From 1976 to 1984, be-
tween 9,000 and 30,000' people were "disappeared"' at the hands of the
1. Comisi6n National Sobre la Desaparaci6n de Personas (CONADEP), NUNCA MAS 410-11 (1984)
[hereinafter NUNCA MAS].
2. See THE FEDERAILsT No. 84 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton argued that there was no need for a bill of
rights because the writ of habeas corpus ensures all rights.
3. For a description and analysis of the failure of habeas corpus in Argentina during the years 1976-83,
see generally, Informe sobre la situaci6nde los derechos humanos (Argentina), OEA/ser. I./R./1 1.49, Doe.
19 (1984); INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RiGHTs 245 [hereinafter OAS REPORT]; Garro &
Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step Forward and Two Steps
Backward, 8 HUM. RTs. L.J. 283, 294-99 (1987); Snyder, State of Siege and Rule of Law in Argentina:
The Politics and Rhetoric of Vindication, 15 AM. LAW. 503, 514-19 (1984); Garro, The Role of the
Judiciary in Controlling GovernmentAction Under a State of Siege, 4 HUM. RTs. L.J. 311, 330-36 (1983).
4. The exact number of disappeared persons is contested and has become a political issue. CONADEP
estimated the number of disappeared at 8,960, but noted that the actual number could be higher because
fear likely deterred many from reporting disappearances. NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 479-81. Human
rights groups insist that the number is much higher, and estimates in press reports varied widely from 6,000
to 15,000. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, Dictatorship on Trial: Prosecution of Human Rights Violations
in Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 118, 120 & n.2 (1984). Some human rights groups continue to insist
on the figure of 30,000, but most acknowledge it is a lesser figure. See, e.g., Osiel, The Making of Human
Rights Policy in Argentina: The Impact of Ideas and Interests on a Legal Conflict, 18 J. LATIN AM. STUD.
135, 145 n.24 (1986) (placing estimate at 12,000 disappearances).
5. The term "disappeared" is a euphemism for the forced and unacknowledged abduction of persons
by the state military, security, or police forces or by other state-sanctioned groups. A number of other
human rights abuses such as incomnunicado detention, torture and/or arbitrary execution generally occur
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Argentine military, police and security forces. s Thousands more were detained
for long periods by executive order without trial or without being charged with
an offense.7 The habeas corpus petitions filed by relatives and friends on
behalf of those detained provided virtually no relief.
In 1984, the democratically elected Congress passed Law 23.098 ("Habeas
Corpus Act"), which updated, consolidated and reformed the habeas corpus
process! The Act, however, did not confront many of the causes of the
wholesale failure of habeas corpus under the dictatorship. Important questions
remain concerning the effectiveness of habeas corpus protections.9 This study
evaluates habeas corpus law during and after the dictatorship and argues that
further fundamental changes are necessary before the guarantees of habeas
corpus are adequate in Argentina.
This study addresses three central questions:
1. Has the right of habeas corpus been an effective method of protect-
ing human rights in Argentina?
2. What is the state of the law of habeas corpus in Argentina today?
3. In what ways could Argentine habeas corpus be further strength-
ened to address past failures in the process?
In examining these questions, this study concentrates on certain aspects of
habeas corpus to the exclusion of others.10 A petition for habeas corpus in
Argentina can be corrective or preventive in nature. It can seek the liberty of
a person or the removal or correction of an injurious situation during a legiti-
mate detention. While acknowledging the right of all those arrested to the
protections offered by habeas corpus, this study focuses on those petitions
in connection with a disappearance. Because the phenomenon of disappearances is so wide-ranging in scope
and currently has no adequate general or legal definition, the term is often accompanied by quotation marks.
6. NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 479-82.
7. Id. at 408-16.
8. Law 23.098, promulgated Oct. 19, 1984 [hereinafter Habeas Corpus Act], reprinted in XLIV-D
Anales de legislaci6nArgentina [hereinafter A.D.L.A.] 3733 (1984) (English translation of Habeas Corpus
Act attached as Appendix). For description and analysis of the Habeas Corpus Act, see 2 N. SAG0S,
DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL: HABEAS CORPUS 109-491 (1988) [hereinafter N. SAG0S, HABEAS
CORPUS]; P. BISSERIER & F. TAL6N, HABEAS CORPUS: NuEvo R]GIMEN LEGAL - LEY 23.098 (1985);
Bertolino, Para una reformulaci6n del 'habeas corpus': a prop6sito de la ley nacional 23.098,
JURiSPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 671 (1985); D'Albora, El procedimiento de hbeas corpus en la Icy 23.098,
113 EL DERECHO 971 (1985); Sagails, Nuevo rdginen del hdbeas corpus (Ley 23.098), 1985-B REViSTA
JURIDICA ARGENTINA - LA LEY [hereinafter L.L.] 891 (1985).
9. For views of habeas corpus law within the general context of human rights in Argentina, see M.
SANcINETTI, DERECHOS-HUMANOS EN LA ARGENTINA POST-DICTATORIAL (1988); Garro & Dahl, supra
note 3; AMERICAS WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA (1987) [hereinafter AMERICAS
WATCH REPORT]; Nina, The Human Rights Policy of the Argentine Constitutional Government, 10 YALE
J. INT'L L. 217 (1985). For a general discussion of social and political forces that affect human rights in
Argentina, see D. PONEMAN, ARGENTINA, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL (1987); Osiel, supra note 4.
10. For a description of the various forms of habeas corpus and their uses in Argentine law, see N.
SAGOfs, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 144-45.
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brought to question the legitimacy of arrests or detentions of individuals held
for "political" reasons.11
A. The Judicial - Executive Relationship
During the military dictatorship, the habeas corpus process was the sole
method by which individuals could challenge the legality of detentions carried
out by the military. Most habeas corpus petitions brought on behalf of the
"disappeared" followed a set pattern.1 2 Individuals would be reported missing,
often after they had been detained by bands of armed men claiming some type
of military authority (either by showing military identification or orders or
simply by appearing in military apparel). 3 Family members or friends would
then bring a habeas corpus petition to attempt to locate the missing individual.
When a court of first instance directed a request for information to the Minis-
try of Interior, the armed forces or the federal or local police forces, these
officials invariably replied that they had no information concerning the deten-
tion of the individual, often despite eyewitness reports of the presence of the
person in one of the military's clandestine detention centers. 4 Based on the
military's response, however, the judge would issue an opinion that the
individual was not being detained by the executive and would dismiss the
habeas corpus petition. In short, the false reports submitted by the military to
the courts and the failure of the judiciary to question those statements or to
investigate further rendered the habeas corpus procedure useless."5
11. For purposes of this study, the term "political arrests" refers to arrests or detentions motivated
by political objectives or a desire to restrict a person's freedom of speech or freedom of association, as
opposed to arrests for common crimes, such as robbery, assault or murder. The author realizes that this
distinction is often difficult to make (e.g., in the case of a murder that is motivated by political belief or
the exercise of the freedom of speech in a manner that violates common law).
12. For a description of disappearances and subsequent attempts to locate individuals through habeas
corpus petitions, see generally NUNCA MAS, supra note 1; OAS REPORT, supra note 3.
13. The overall responsibility for conducting the "war against subversion" was given to the army, and
local police forces remained under its control. Decree No. 404/75, promulgated Oct. 28, 1975. During
the dictatorship, federal security forces operated in a "green zone" where local officials promised not to
interfere. National Appeals Court (Argentina), Judgment on Human Rights Violations by Forner Military
Leaders, 26 I.L.M. 317, 336 (A. Garro & E. Dahl trans. 1987) [hereinafter Judgment on Human Rights].
The federal security forces maintained dozens of secretive detention centers throughout the country to hold,
interrogate, and torture individuals who had been detained both officially and unofficially. NUNCA MAS,
supra note 1, at 54-78. The military junta also passed Law 23.383, which amended article 618 of the
Criminal Procedure Code to provide that only federal criminal courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
petitions, except for a limited number of cases. Law 23.383, promulgated Jan. 28, 1981, reprinted in XLI-
A A.D.L.A. 147 (1981); C6DIGo DE PROCEDIMIENTOS EN MATERIA PENAL, art. 618 (Abeledo-Perrot 14th
ed. 1986) [hereinafter C6DIGO PROC. PENAL]. See also NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 403.
14. Id. The NUNCA MAs report found that more than 1,300 disappeared persons were seen in secret
detention centers during a period when legal efforts to determine their whereabouts were ineffective. NUNCA
MAs, supra note 1, at 479.
15. Id. at 404.
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The interaction of three factors thus caused the failure of habeas corpus:
the noncompliance of the executive, the failure of the judiciary to effectively
challenge the executive and the failure of Argentine society to react to the
illegal actions of the military government once they became known. The Nunca
mds report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared
("CONADEP Commission"), issued in 1984, determined that the failure of
habeas corpus was not the result of inadequate statutory or constitutional
protection, but was due to "a government which instructed its officials to
ignore the norms governing its application."16 Other commentators claim that
habeas corpus and the "rule of law" are inapplicable to detentions and noncom-
pliance by illegitimate governments.17 This Article argues that the relationship
between the judiciary and the executive determines the success of habeas
corpus protections. Habeas corpus provided one of the only methods the
judiciary could use to hold military governments to human rights standards
established in Argentine law. The writ remains a tool that a conscientious and
courageous judiciary must use to challenge unconstitutional actions of an
authoritarian regime. The study of the judiciary's use of habeas corpus during
the dictatorship and the executive's response point to ways in which the habeas
corpus process could be strengthened to provide protection against future
repression of individual rights.
B. Historical Context
1. Political History
During the last sixty years, Argentina has experienced a continuing cycle
of political, economic and social instability."8 Beginning with the ouster of
President Hip6lito Yrigoyen in 1930, successive military governments have
seized power, allowing an occasional period of civilian rule. Senator Carlos
Menem's election to replace President Ratil Alfonsfn in May, 1989, represent-
ed the first time in sixty-three years that one constitutionally elected president
16. Id. at 404-05.
17. Snyder, supra note 3, at 518-19. Snyder argues that the continued functioning of habeas corpus
during military governments in fact gave legitimacy to their actions. One human rights attorney interviewed
in connection with this article summed up the sentiment by stating that habeas corpus in Argentina functions
for legitimatearrests, but cannot provide protection against illegitimate detentions. Interviews with Antonio
Rojas Salinas, Attorney for the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Feb. 21, 28, 1989) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Salinas Interviews].
18. See generally D. PONEMAN, supra note 9.
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replaced another. 9 A political system which creates such instability does not
lend itself to respect for the rule of law.
Political instability has also weakened the force of the Argentine Con-
stitution. Since 1939, Argentina has been under a "state of siege," during
which the government suspends constitutional rights almost fifty percent of the
time. The practice has been even more prevalent in the recent past. In the
twenty year period between 1966 and 1986, Argentina was under a state of
siege sixty-five percent of the time, while the military dictatorship from 1976
to 1986 observed a state of siege eighty percent of the time.2' This back-
ground of political instability profoundly weakened habeas corpus protections
in Argentina.
2. Legal History
Argentine law has few, if any, original institutions. It has been influenced
by Spain (criminal procedure); Italy (administrative law, commercial code, and
civil code), France (civil code and administrative procedure), Germany (penal
code), and the United States (constitutional law). 2' The result is a complicated
legal system that cannot be explained entirely under a civil or common law
model. Most foreign contributions were partially accepted, then mixed together
and adapted to political circumstances. Habeas corpus is an example of such
a mixture. It was originally a constitutionally based common law institution
that was governed by a criminal procedure code until the passage of the
Habeas Corpus Act.
The process of amparo is a complementary example of the peculiar nature
of the Argentine legal system. Amparo is a writ in Argentine law whereby the
petitioner can seek protection from any government infringement of rights.'
Technically, habeas corpus is a subspecies of amparo, allowing individuals to
seek relief from a restriction of ambulatory rights.' Beginning in 1957, the
Argentine Supreme Court developed amparo as a method of granting injunctive
relief for the violation of constitutional rights. In the case of Angel Siri, the
19. President Juan Per6n modified the 1853 Constitution in order to be reelected. Menem's election
was the first occasion in which a president from one party was replaced by a member of a different party
elected through open, unbiased elections.
20. CONSEJO PARA LA CONSOLIDACI6N DE LA DEMOCRACIA, REFORMA coNsTrrUcioNAL: DICTAMEN
PRELIMINAR 304-05 (EUDEBA ed. 1986) [hereinafter REFORMA CONSTrTUCIONAL I].
21. For example, the drafters of the Criminal Procedure Code explicitly acknowledged that the Code
was in part derived from the Spanish Criminal Code. See C6DIGo PRoc. PENAL 7-27 (Abeledo-Perrot 14th
ed. 1986).
22. F. NEWMAN & D. WEISSERODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 232, n.1 (1990).
23. Saggis considers habeas corpus a subspecies of amparo. The laws regulating amparo can have
a supplementary function in applying and interpreting the laws regulating habeas corpus process, allowing
courts to look to the rule governing amparo if habeas corpus law is silent on a particular point. N. SAG0tS,
HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 117-18.
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Supreme Court invalidated an order from the executive to arrest Siri and to
close his newspaper.24 The Court based its decision on its constitutional duty
to protect individual rights.' In the Samuel Kot decision, the Supreme Court
noted that in Argentine law habeas corpus derives from article 18 of the
Constitution of 1853, and follows the common law tradition of the Anglo-
Saxon writ.26 The Court thus confirmed that the Constitution grants courts
the power to issue both habeas corpus and amparo writs.'
C. Constitutional Context
1. The Argentine Constitutional System
a. The Sources and Evolution of the Argentine Constitution
Argentina is currently governed by the Constitution of 1853, the oldest
Latin American constitution still in force today. This fact is deceptive. The
Constitution of 1853 was reformed in 1860, 1868 and 1898. In 1949, the
Peronists replaced a major part of the 1853 text with their own constitution.
In 1957 the government returned to the constitutional text of 1853, and reforms
were made again in 1966.
When the military took power in 1976, it quickly moved to enact its own
reform of the Constitution of 1966 by promulgating the Statute for the Process
of National Reorganization ("Process").28 The Process provided that the
Constitution was to remain in force only to the extent that it did not contradict
provisions in the Process or laws promulgated pursuant to it. The Supreme
Court later held that those laws were integrated into the Constitution.29 The
restrictive laws of the military government thereby acquired the legitimacy of
quasi-constitutional status.
24. 239 Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [hereinafter Fallos] 459, 464 (1957).
25. Id. at 463.
26. 241 Fallos 291, 292; See also Feinrider, Judicial Review and the Protection of Human Rights
Under Military Governments in Brazil and Argentina, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 171, 189 (1981)
[hereinafter Feinrider].
27. 241 Fallos at 298, 301.
28. Promulgated Mar. 24, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1021 (1976), English translation,
reprinted in 1 CONsTrruTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, 26-30 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanes eds.
1983) [hereinafter CONsTITuTIONS OF THE WORLD]. For a description of the Process and its contents, see
Snyder, supra note 3, at 508-12; Garro & Dahl, supra note 3, at 291-93; OAS REPORT, supra note 3, at
21-22.
29. Jaime Lokman, 299 Fallos 142, 146 (1977). See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
Vol. 16:1, 1991
Habeas Corpus Law in Argentina
b. Argentine Federalism
In Argentina, both federal and provincial constitutions govern habeas
corpus procedures? Because the great majority of the detentions during the
dictatorship were by federal authorities at federal institutions, this study will
concentrate on the federal law of habeas corpus.
In Argentina there are three levels of federal courts, namely: courts or
judges of first instance in specialized matter (e.g. criminal, civil, labor);
equally specialized federal courts of appeal (e.g., Cimaras Fiederales de
Apelaci6n en lo Criminal y Correccional); and the Supreme Court of Argen-
tina. The Federal Courts of Criminal Appeal are the highest level of criminal
courts, but appeal is possible to the Supreme Court on questions of constitu-
tional law. There are eleven federal courts of appeal.in Argentina. The Federal
Court of Criminal Appeals of Buenos Aires consists of six judges, normally
sitting in panels of three judges each. 3'
c. The Role of the Judiciary
The civil law role of the Supreme Court in the Argentine constitutional
system and the absence of stare decisis create problems for the development
of effective habeas corpus standards. In the Argentine judicial system, as in
other civil law systems, Supreme Court decisions only have effect for the case
at bar, and decisions are not binding on lower courts or future Supreme Court
decisions.32 Nonetheless, Supreme Court decisions are said to exercise an
influence "more moral than judicial" on other courts.3 The uncertain role
of legal precedent, instead of freeing the Court from antiquated and conserva-
tive decisions, merely acts to inhibit the development of clear, concise and
reliable legal standards. The Court is not bound to follow prior standards or
decisions. Inconsistent prior decisions are never overturned or even discussed.
Consistent prior cases, however, are cited for their precedential value, giving
decisions the appearance of legal continuity. 4 Because inconsistent decisions
30. For a discussion of the interrelation of federal and provincial habeas corpus laws, see N. SAGO-S,
HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 123-25.
31. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE MILITARY JUNTAS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE TRIAL
OF THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS, 1985,. at 15-16 (1987); Garro & Dahl, supra note 3, at 308 & n.105.
32. CONSEJO PARA LA CONSOLIDACI6N DE LA DEMOCRACIA, REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL: DICTAMEN
SEGUNDO 52-53, (1987) [hereinafter REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL II]; J. VANOSSI, LA CONST1TUCl6N
NACIONAL Y LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 26 (1988).
33. J. VANOSSI, supra note 32, at 26.
34. For an example of the Argentine Supreme Court's proforma treatment of precedent, see Carlos
Mariano Zamorano, 298 Fallos 441 (1977), and Hebe Magarita Tizio, 299 Fallos 294 (1977).
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are never overturned or reconciled with new standards, the courts, on any
given case, can choose from a wide range of precedent.35
This limited flexibility complements judicial independence in other areas.
Judges in the Argentine civil law system have special investigatory powers
because of their dual role as judges and prosecutors. Judges of the first in-
stance have the power to conduct searches, require testimony or the production
of evidence, and perform other functions that, under the Anglo-American
adversarial system, are carried out by the prosecutor.
2. Habeas Corpus in the Argentine Constitution
a. Article 18
The various Argentine constitutions have treated habeas corpus with
differing degrees of specificity.36 The Argentine Constitution of 1853 does
not expressly provide for the right of habeas corpus. Article 18 provides in
part, "[n]o one can be compelled to testify against himself, nor be arrested
except by virtue of a written order from a competent authority."37 While
reforms to article 18 have not always specified habeas corpus as a constitution-
al right, courts and constitutional scholars have generally interpreted article
18 to implicitly incorporate the right of habeas corpus, adopting the common
law development of the right as the constitutional standard.38 Under the
Argentine constitutional system, constitutional rights are protected in the
federal courts; the Supreme Court has the power to develop habeas corpus law
to protect article 18 rights.39 The Supreme Court can also evaluate legislation
35. REFo RA CONSTITUCIONALII, supra note 32, at 52-53. The Argentine Council for the Consolida-
tion of Democracy has proposed a reform in the Argentine judicial system that would introduce a partial
practice of stare decisis. Id. Under the proposed reform, Supreme Court decisions would be binding on
lower courts but not on future Supreme Court cases. This reform would give the Court incentive to clarify
precedent and aid in resolving the arbitrariness of many habeas corpus decisions. Id.
36. For a history of the various constitutions of Argentina, see CONsTITUTIONs OF THE WORLD, supra
note 28, at i-xiii.
37. CoNsTrruci6NDE LA ARGENTINA, art. 18 (1853) (quotations are to the 1968 Pan American Union
Translation) [hereinafter ARGENTINE CONSTrrTrON], reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra
note 28. For an historical description of the development of habeas corpus in Argentine constitutional law,
see N. SAG0s, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 61-81.
38. Fundamentos de proyecto de ley 23.098, DIARIO DE SESSIONES DE LA CAMARA, CAMARA DE
SENADORES, Sept., 1984, Vol. III, 2025, 2029, 2035 (statements of Sens. F. de la Rda and C. Menem)
[l6ereinafterFUNDAMENTOS]; H. FiX-ZAMUDIO, LA PROTECCI6NJURfDICA Y PROCESALDE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS ANTE LAS JURISDICCIONES NACIONALES 71-72 & n.153 (1982); N. SAGOta, HABEAS CORPUS,
supra note 8, at 75; Feinrider, supra note 26, at 187-88.
39. The Supreme Court established this in the seminal case Samuel Kot, S.R.L., 241 Fallos 291, 296
(1958), in which it held that whenever the illegitimacy of a restriction on any essential rights clearly creates
a grave and irreparable injury, the issue shall be submitted through the appropriate administrative orjudicial
procedures to allow the judiciary to immediately reestablish the restricted right.
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regulating habeas corpus to ensure that it does not restrict article 18's basic
guarantees.'
b. Legislative Development
The development of habeas corpus law in Argentina also occurs legisla-
tively.4' Subject to the provisions of article 28 of the Argentine Constitution,
the legislature is expressly vested with the power to develop and regulate the
law of habeas corpus.4" During the dictatorship, the regulations governing
federal habeas corpus law were codified in the Criminal Procedure Code ("the
Code").' The Code established the federal criminal courts as the courts of
first instance for habeas corpus petitions, with a right of appeal to the Federal
Court of Criminal Appeals." The Code also provided a fairly comprehensive
regulation of the habeas corpus process. The regulations required the detainee,
or someone acting on his or her behalf, to submit a simple petition containing
the detainee's name, the allegation of illegal detention, the name or position
of the authority responsible for the allegedly illegal detention, and a copy of
any writ or decree that ordered the detention.45 The judge hearing the petition
was required to issue a writ that inquired of the responsible authority the status
of the detained individual. If there was no apparent legitimate reason for the
detention, the Code required the judge to order the release of the detainee.'
The process was to be completed within twenty-four hours. Finally, the regula-
40. Some scholars have suggested that the Court may also limit the application of legislation regulating
habeas corpus if the legislation impinges on court created standards governing article 18 rights. This
proposition, however, ignores the Supreme Court's civil law role, which is limited to the interpretation
of statutes and not to the creation of law.
41. N. SAGs0, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 112-13.
42. ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at art. 67, cls. 11, 28. Article 28 provides that
constitutional guarantees "may not be altered by the laws that regulate their exercise."
43. C6DIGo PROC. PENAL, arts. 617-45 (AZ eds. 1983). Since new laws automatically nullify
previously existing laws in the Argentine legal system, readers interested in the history of Argentine habeas
corpus must trace the cited regulations prior to the Habeas Corpus Act in the following editions of the
Criminal Procedure Code: C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENAL (Abeledo-Perrot ed. 1974); C6DIGO DE
PROCEDIMiENTOS PENAL (V. Zavalfa ed. 1979); C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENAL (AZ ed. 1981);
C6DIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENAL (AZ ed. 1983). Articles 617-45 of the Code were originally created
by Law 2372 in 1888, based on the habeas corpus statutes of the states of Louisiana and New York.
CODIGO PROC. PENAL, arts. 617-45 (Abeledo-Perrot ed. 1974). See also N. SAGOUS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra
note 8, at 112. The habeas corpus material of the Criminal Procedure Code was reformed by Law 16.478,
promulgated Sept. 29, 1964, reprinted in XXIV-C A.D.L.A. 1986 (1964); Law 18.799, promulgated Oct.
5, 1970, reprinted in XXX-C A.D.L.A. 3075 (1970); Law 20.510, promulgated May 27, 1973, reprinted
in XXXIII-C A.D.L.A. 2953 (1973); Law 21.312, promulgated May 4, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B
A.D.L.A. 1097 (1976); and Law 23.383, promulgated Jan. 28, 1981, reprinted in XLI-A A.D.L.A. 147
(1981).,
44. C6DIGO PROC. PENAL at art. 618. For an example of this process, see the summary of procedural
history in Inds Ollero, 300 Fallos 457, 460 (1978).
45. C6DIGO PROC. PENAL at art. 622.
46. Id. at arts. 619, 623, 634-35.
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tions provided for the mandatory cooperation of the named authority in the
habeas corpus process, including the presentation of the detained individual
to the judge and the completion of a detailed report on the reasons for the
detention.
D. The State of Siege Problem
1. Article 23
The Constitution of 1853 provides that the executive may declare a state
of siege during a foreign attack or when internal disorder threatens the opera-
tion of the government.47 Article 23 provides that the declaration of a state
of siege suspends the protection of constitutional rights. It does not, however,
set a time limit on that suspension. Article 23 also permits the executive to
arrest and transfer persons from one point of the nation to another during a
state of siege. While articles providing similar powers to the executive are
common in the constitutions of many Western democracies, 4' abuse of these
powers has most drastically curtailed the protection of basic human rights in
Argentina. In contrast to the high threshold guarding the state of siege provi-
sion in the United States Constitution, 49 article 23 sets a lower limit, allowing
the executive to proclaim a state of siege in less extreme circumstances. 5°
47. Article 23 of the 1853 Constitution states:
In the event of internal disorder or foreign attack endangering the operation of this Constitution
and of the authorities created thereby, the Province or territory in which the disturbance of order
exists shall be declared in a state of siege and the constitutional guarantees shall be suspended
therein. But during such suspension the President of the Republic shall not convict or apply
punishment upon his own authority. His power shall be limited, in such a case, with respect to
persons, to arresting them or transferring them from one point of the Nation to another, if they
do not prefer to leave Argentine territory.
ARGENTINE CoNSTrrTTION, supra note 37, at art. 23 (1853). Article 23 also limits the declaration to the
province or territory of the disturbance. Which governmental body declares the state of siege depends on
the nature of the precipitating crisis. If the declaration is due to foreign attack, the president may declare
the state of siege with the consent of the Senate. Id. at arts. 53 & 86, cl. 19. If the declaration is due to
internal disorder, the Congress must make the declaration; if the Congress is not in session, the president
may declare the state of siege subject to the approval of the Congress when it reconvenes. Id. at art. 67,
cl. 26. For a general discussion of the role of the state of siege provision in Argentine constitutional
development, see REFORMA CONSTrrTCIONAL I, supra note 20, at 293-305; N. SAG0fS, HABEAS CORPUS,
supra note 8, at 233-99.
48. See CONSEIO PARA LA CONSOLIDACI6N DE LA DEMOCRACIA, DISPOSICIONES RELATIVAS A ESTADO
DE SrrIO EN EL DERECHO CONST1TUCIONAL COMPARADO (1986); see also Snyder, supra note 3, at 506-07
(noting suspension of habeas corpus by President Lincoln during the U.S. Civil War).
49. The United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,
121 (1866), held that martial law could not "be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority
of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed." For a discussion of
Milligan, see L. TRINE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIOA.L LAW 179-80 (1978).
50. Snyder, supra note 3, at 506-07; REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL I, supra note 20, at 304-05.
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The wide range of executive powers under article 23 requires effective
judicial oversight to protect civil rights during periods of institutional instabili-
ty. Habeas corpus law in Argentina has functioned as the only, albeit weak,
judicial mechanism to challenge executive detentions during a state of siege.
Habeas corpus law has required courts to determine whether a particular state
of siege has automatically suspended all constitutional rights or whether the
executive only has the ability to suspend specific rights at its discretion. Only
when the latter condition is met have courts been required to determine the
legitimacy of the suspension. 5'
2. Judicial Standards of Review of Habeas Corpus Petitions Under Prior
States of Siege
The Constitution limits the executive's power to arrest and transport
persons under a state of siege. First, the arrest may not amount to a conviction
or punishment.52 Second, persons detained pursuant to article 23 executive
power must be allowed to leave the country, should they choose, rather than
remain in detention ("right of option").53 Article 95 further provides, in
effect, that the executive may not try an individual once he or she has been
charged with an offense, but must turn the detainee over to the judiciary for
processing.54
In principle, the declaration of a state of siege does not suspend the right
of habeas corpus.55 However, courts have been unwilling to extensively chal-
lenge executive action under a state of siege. While executing the habeas
corpus process, courts usually denied petitions if the detainee was held pursu-
ant to the executive's article 23 powers.56 Argentine courts thus have histori-
cally held the executive's decision to detain a person during a state of siege
to be nonjusticiable. Conversely, in amparo proceedings, courts were willing
to examine the executive's suspension of other nonambulatory constitutional
rights.
For example, in 1958 the constitutionally elected government of President
Arturo Frondizi declared a state of siege throughout the country to control a
51. For a discussion of the Argentine judiciary's lack of control over the executive in the exercise
of article 23 powers, see infra Section II.B.2.
52. ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at art. 23.
53. Id.
54. Id. at art. 95.
55. In the case of Marcelo T. de Alvear, 167 Fallos 314, 325 (1933), the Supreme Court held that
the process of habeas corpus remains intact throughout a state of siege ("the declaration of a state of seige
does not suspend habeas corpus with respect to the powers expressly denied the President of the Nation
in relation to personal security').
56. For a discussion of the judiciary's treatment of habeas corpus petitions during a state of siege,
see infra Section II.B.l.b.
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series of strikes that the government considered to be of an "insurrectional
character.""s In reviewing the amparo petition of Antonio Sofias8 the next
year, the Supreme Court for the first time asserted its power to review the
reasonableness of the suspension of a constitutionally guaranteed right during
a state of siege. 9 While affirming that the declaration of a state of siege itself
was a nonjusticiable political question,6° the Court asserted that it could
review executive acts taken pursuant to the state of siege to determine whether
they were "clearly and obviously unreasonable." '61 Using this test, however,
the Sofia Court upheld the executive action at issue. It found that the banning
of a public meeting "organized by an entity that in the opinion of the compe-
tent authority [the police] 'has had a radical left political orientation'.., does
not appear to be irrational. ,62
Later the same year, in reviewing the case of Luis Trossi, the Supreme
Court refused to apply the Sofia reasonableness standard to the review of
habeas corpus petitions.63 Trossi and twenty-seven other individuals were
detained by the executive under its state of siege powers. The habeas corpus
petitions filed on their behalf were denied by the court of first instance, and
the denial was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Trossi appealed to the Supreme
Court, arguing that there was no reasonable relation between his detention and
the declared state of siege. The Court declined to review the habeas corpus
petition, treating the restriction of liberty by the executive as a nonjusticiable
political question:
It is prohibited for judges to substitute themselves for the President of the Nation
in the ascertaining of the correctness or error, justice or injustice of the transitory
measures of defense which he considers necessary to adopt in exercising the
prerogatives that article 23 of the Constitution accord him solely.'
57. 243 Fallos 504, 511 (1959).
58. For a discussion of the SofTa case and its implications on judicial control of the executive's article
23 powers, see REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL I, supra note 20, at 303; Feinrider, supra note 26, at 189;
Garro, supra note 3, at 327-28; Synder, supra note 3, at 513.
59. 243 Fallos at 515. Earlier, the Argentine League for the Rights of Man had applied for authoriza-
tion from the Chief of the Federal Police to hold a meeting to discuss the human rights situation in
Paraguay. The Federal Police denied the request based on the state of siege declaration. 243 Fallos at
510-11. The Federal Court of Appeals overruled the decision of the Federal Police, holding that the article
23 power of the executive to suspend constitutional rights extended only to those rights "incompatible with
the preservation of constitutional order and social peace." Id. at 511 (quoting the Court of Appeals
decision). The Court of Appeals noted that the proposed meeting was not of a "union character and did
not have any relation with the causes that motivated the state of siege." Id.
60. Id. at 514.
61. Id. at 515. The Sofia Court adopted the deferential "clearly and obviously unreasonable" standard
over a minority that argued for a less deferential standard. The dissent stated that the denial of authorization
by the police pursuant to the state of siege should be overruled since it "had no relation to" the underlying
reason for the state of siege. 243 Fallos at 533 (Orgaz, J., dissenting).
62. 243 Fallos at 520.
63. 247 Fallos 528 (1959).
64. Id. at 529-30.
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The Trossi decision thus implicitly limited the reasonableness standard in Sofia
to nonambulatory constitutional rights.
Following Trossi, the Supreme Court reviewed the reasonableness of
executive suspension only in cases of nonambulatory constitutional rights.65
In 1970, in the cases of Primera Plana66 and Ricardo Alberto Canovi,67 the
Supreme Court upheld the Sofia and Trossi decisions and further defined the
situations and the manner in which the judiciary would review executive article
23 actions limiting ambulatory rights. Primera Plana involved an amparo
petition case in which the Supreme Court addressed the closure of a newspaper
by the executive. The Court reaffirmed the judiciary's power to examine the
reasonableness of executive actions made during a state of siege, using a two-
part test for reasonableness. This test involved, first, an examination of the
relation between the affected constitutional guarantee and the state of interior
commotion and, second, a verification of whether the act of the authority was
proportionate to the declared goals of the state of siege.6' The Court affirmed
the judicial power to review executive action, but overturned the lower court's
finding of unreasonableness by holding that the closure of the newspaper was
not "manifestly irrational" in light of the declared purpose of the state of
siege.69
The Supreme Court continued to undercut the Sofia holding in Canovi.70
In Canovi, the Court determined that it could not review executive detentions
unless they transgressed article 23 limits. The executive could not impose
"punishment" and had to guarantee the detainee's right of option to leave the
country. 71 The Canovi Court went on to find that the arrest and transport of
persons is not a punishment or penalty under article 23, but an exclusively
political method of protecting the internal peace.72 Therefore, prior to the
1976 dictatorship, the Supreme Court had clearly established that the judiciary
65. See, e.g., Diarios Norte [and] Voz peronista, 244 Fallos 59, 62 (1959) (upholding an executive
suspension of certain publications while applying the reasonableness standard); Semanario Azul y blanco,
250 Fallos 832, 841 (1961) (upholding an executive order to close a newspaper, stating that executive
orders pursuant to article 23 were subject to judicial review under the reasonableness standard).
66. 276 Fallos 72 (1970).
67. 278 Fallos 337 (1970).
68. 276 Fallos at 81.
69. Id.
70. Canovi was detained, along with ninety-three other individuals, pursuant to a general executive
order under the Onganfa state of siege. Canovi had no police record, and there was no allegation that he
was involved in union activity. Rather, there was evidence that Canovi was a longtime employee of General
Motors with a good work history. He was also a law student at the University of Buenos Aires and had
no disciplinary record and no record of belonging to any student group. Canovi testified before the court
of first instance that he had no political affiliations. The court of first instance granted the habeas corpus
petition and freed Canovi. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated Canovi's detention. 278 Fallos
at 330-43.
71. Id. at 340. The decision leftunclear whatstandard ofreview the Supreme Court intended to apply.
72. Id.
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would not review the reasonableness of executive detentions during a state of
siege. 73
II. HABEAS CoRPuS UNDER THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP: 1976-1983
A. Abuses of the State of Siege Powers
When the Argentine military replaced the civilian government of Isabel
Martinez de Per6n on March 22, 1976, to "save the country from economic
chaos and the threat" of terrorism, it inherited a state of siege already over a
year old.74 The military also inherited a number of restrictions placed on the
habeas corpus process by the Per6n government pursuant to its article 23 pow-
ers.' General Tomds Sanch6z de Bustamante summarized the military
regime's attitude:
There are legal norms which do not apply in this instance, for example, the writ
of habeas corpus. In this type of struggle, the inherent secrecy with which our
special operations must be conducted requires that we not divulge whom we have
captured and whom we want to capture; everything has to be enveloped in a cloud
of silence.
76
The military established its "cloud of silence" by extending the state of siege
restrictions and further limiting the right of habeas corpus.
73. However, the Supreme Court recognized a transgression of the limitations of article 23 by the
executive in one habeas corpus action. In 1972 Fernando Luis Chaves was detained by executive order
pursuant to a state of siege. Chaves petitioned the executive to leave the country, and upon denial of his
petition brought a habeas corpus action to enforce his article 23 right. The judge of first instance determined
that there was no charge or investigation pending against Chaves and found no reason to deny Chaves'
petition. The executive continued to prevent Chaves from leaving the country. The Supreme Court found
that the executive's denial of Chaves' petition to leave the country was a penalty or punishment in violation
of article 23. It thus ordered that Chaves be allowed to leave the country within five days. 282 Fallos 63
(1972).
74., On November 6, 1974, the Per6n government declared a state of siege over the entire country
due to terrorist attacks. Decree No. 1368/74,. promulgated Nov. 6, 1974. For a description of the
circumstances surrounding this state of siege, see OAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 20 & n. 12; Garro & Dahl,
supra note 3, at 288 & n.13. The state of siege was continued by the Per6n government in Decree No.
2717/75, promulgated Oct. 1, 1975, and was kept in place by the successive military juntas from 1976
to 1983. The government of President Reynaldo Bignone lifted the state of siege after the October, 1983
elections. Decree No. 2834/83, promulgated Nov. 28, 1983.
75. Decree No. 807/75, promulgated Apr. 1, 1975, established a process for the exercise of the article
23 right to leave the country. It provided that all petitions be submitted to the Minister of Interior, who
would investigate whether an order existed for the capture or detention of the individual that prevented
him or her from leaving the country. Decree No. 642/76, promulgated Feb. 17, 1976, provided that
petitions to leave the country would be denied if the petitioner wished to go to certain countries. It further
provided that writs of habeas corpus would be stayed while the lower court's decisions were appealed.
76. NUNCA MAs, supra note 1, at 402, citing La Capital, Rosario, June 14, 1980.
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1. Elimination of an Independent Judiciary
The military government first instituted measures to eliminate the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. The junta immediately dismissed the national Supreme
Court, the federal Attorney General and the supreme courts of the provinc-
es.' The new members of the judiciary were required to swear allegiance
both to the Constitution and to the Process. The military also required the
president to automatically confirm its nominees to the vacant seats. While the
Process retained the article 96 guarantee of life tenure during good behavior
for the new appointees,7" this manipulation of the judiciary severely curtailed
its ability to act independently.79 These measures were not expressly directed
at the process of habeas corpus, but by significantly reducing judicial indepen-
dence they reduced the judiciary's ability to challenge executive detentions
through habeas corpus petitions.
2. Limitations on Habeas Corpus Procedure
The military regime also relied on its article 23 powers to limit habeas
corpus procedures. The most direct limitation was a law that suspended a
favorable decision on a writ of habeas corpus during appeal, requiring the
detainee to remain under arrest."0 The regulation distinguished between those
persons detained by the executive pursuant to its state of siege powers and
those detained for some other reason. Those detained by executive order under
article 23 could not be released until the government's final appeal of the
decision.81
The appeals provision eliminated any possibility that habeas corpus could
function effectively. during the military regime. Even if the judge of 'first
instance ordered the release of an individual detained under the state of siege,
the individual inevitably remained in jail while the public prosecutor appealed
77. Law 21.258, promulgated Mar. 24, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1032 (1976).
78. The Process, promulgated Mar. 24, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1021 (1976), at art.
10.
79. Many commentators argue that the courts lacked sufficient independence to carry out their role
as investigators and enforcers of constitutional rights during the dictatorship. See, e.g., NUNCA MAS, supra
note 1, at 391-92; OAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 240-41; Feinrider, supra note 26, at 196 & n. 183; Garro
& Dahl, supra note 3, at 290 & n.21. Others note that the judiciary retained some degree of independence.
See OAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 242 (report of Commission's interview with Dr. Adolfo Gabrielli, then
President of the Argentine Supreme Court). See also A. GABRIELLI, LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE
LA NACI6N Y LA OP1IN6N PfiBLICA, 1976-1983, at 5 (1986).
80. Law 21.312, promulgated May 18, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1097 (1976).
81. This restriction was first introduced in 1970 by the de facto military government of President
Onganfa. See Law 18.799, promulgated Oct. 5, 1970, reprinted in XXX-C A.D.L.A. 3075 (1970). In 1976,
the military regime passed a law ratifying the restriction. Decree 642/76, promulgated Feb. 17, 1976,
reprinted in XXXVI-A A.D.L.A. 126 (1976).
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the decision. Because federal prosecutors were under the authority of the
Ministry of Interior (the branch of the executive responsible for article 23
detentions), they appealed habeas corpus judgments favorable to detainees.
While the appeals law required appeal within 48 hours, the entire appeals
process could last months or even years.8 2 In addition, individuals often
disappeared after the courts of first instance granted their petitions and ordered
their release. 3
The military further restricted the process of habeas corpus by limiting the
number of judges competent to hear habeas corpus petitions. Article 618 of
the Criminal Procedure Code established that "federal criminal judges of the
capital and the national territories" were competent to hear habeas corpus
petitions.84 This provision did not make clear whether both national and
federal judges, or federal judges alone, would be competent to hear
petitions.85 The military government also restricted the number of judges by
passing Law 22.383, which provided that only federal judges with competence
to hear criminal cases could hear petitions.86 This restriction reduced the
number ofjudges available to hear habeas corpus petitions in the federal capital
from thirty-seven to five and assured that the petitions would be heard by a
controllable number of federal magistrates loyal to the Process.87
The military adopted many unofficial restrictive practices in addition to the
jurisdiction regulations and manipulation of the appeals process. For example,
the military posted ,notices in the courts which stated that habeas corpus
petitions would not be accepted without the signature of a lawyer.88 The
attorneys general instructed the courts of first instance to record the names and
attorney numbers of all attorneys submitting habeas corpus petitions as a meth-
82. NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 401-02.
83. Id.; Garro & Dahl, supra note 3, at 295.
84. CoDICo PROC. PENAL at art. 618.
85. N. SAGOs, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 324-35. In the Argentine federal capital there are
judges that are designated "national" (local judges equivalent to the provincial judges, but federal in the
sense that their jurisdiction is a federal territory), and judges that are designated "federal" (judges with
competency to hear federal questions). Id. at 324. Both national and federal judges could hear habeas corpus
petitions until the military imposed these restrictions.
86. Law 22.383, promulgated Jan. 28, 1981, reprinted in XLI-A A.D.L.A. 147 (1981).
87. Interview with Dr. Luis Fernando Nifio, Judge of Criminal Instruction, First Instance, No. 3,
Capital Federal, Buenos Aires (June 1, 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nifio Interview]. See also
NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 403 (attributing the failure of habeas corpus in part to the restrictive standard
of competence). Judge Nifio described how federal judges summarily handled habeas corpus decisions,
converted them to criminal complaints for the illegal deprivation of liberty and transferred them to national
judges. The investigations of Judge Nifuo's predecessor, Judge Carlos Oliveri, in the illegal deprivation
cases produced much of the evidence used in the eventual trial of the military commanders for human rights
violations. Id. See also Judgment on Human Rights, supra note 13, at 339; AMERICAS WATCH REPORT,
supra note 9, at 53.
88. This requirement was unprecedented and was never officially announced. See Mignone, Estlund
& Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 121 & n.10.
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od of intimidation.89 Large numbers of attorneys who assisted families of the
disappeared were detained or disappeared.9"
3. Other Restrictions Under the State of Siege Powers
In addition to restrictions that directly limited the procedure of habeas
corpus, the military passed numerous laws that sought to remove certain types
of executive actions from the review of the courts. If a detention or practice
could be categorized as within the executive's state of siege powers, the
judiciary could not issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the
individual or the cessation of the practice. The junta enacted a number of
decrees and laws manipulating article 23 to provide the military with the
broadest possible latitude for the detention and treatment of those considered
subversives.
The military first eliminated the restrictions provided by the "convictions
and punishments" clause of article 23. The military defined a large number
of actions that could be taken pursuant to the power of arrest and transport that
were not to be considered "conviction or punishment."'" The military also
gave itself the power to 'determine the manner of arrest and the site of deten-
tion,92 and decreed that the article 23 power of arrest and transport includes
the power to detain an individual indefinitely, while the military would have
the power to interrogate the individual and gather evidence for summary
proceedings.93 The military also expanded its power to arrest a suspect either
caughtflagrante delicto, or when the military had "strong indications" or "half-
conclusive" proofs of crimes.94 Finally, the military government included
under its article 23 powers the authority to proceed with preliminary hearings
that could result in prison sentences. 95
Additional manipulations involved a series of decrees and laws that limited
the exercise of the article 23 right of option to abandon the country. The
military government immediately suspended this right upon taking power and
codified the suspension a few months later.96 The suspension was left in place
89. Nifio Interview, supra note 87. The attorneys general during this period were Dr. Elias P.
Guastavino and Dr. Mario Justo Ldpez.
90. Id. See also NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 416-24.
91. Garro & Dahl, supra note 3, at 292-93; Snyder, supra note 3, at 511.
92. Law 21.650, promulgated Nov. 26, 1977, reprinted in XXXVII-D A.D.L.A. 3746 (1977).
93. Law 21.460, promulgated Nov. 18, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-D A.D.L.A. 2894 (1976).
94. Id.
95. Law 21.264, promulgated Mar. 24, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1034 (1976); Law
21.268, promulgated Mar. 24, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1036 (1976).
96. Law 21.275, promulgated Mar. 29, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1040 (1976).
Subsequently, Laws 21.448 and 21.449, promulgated Oct. 27, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-D A.D.L.A.
2867, 2868 (1976), created a commission within the Ministry of Interior to supervise the'right to leave
the country subject to internal security conditions and further prolonged the suspension of the right of option
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until September, 1977, when the military enacted a new process so complicat-
ed, and with so many discretionary controls that it almost never resulted in the
successful release of a detainee.97
B. Judicial Control of Habeas Corpus Under the Dictatorship
1. Military Restrictions of Habeas Corpus Upheld
During the military dictatorship the Supreme Court denied every challenge
to official and unofficial restrictions on the habeas corpus process. No court
invalidated any of the restrictions on the grounds either that they impinged on
the guarantees of articles 18 or 23 or that they restricted the process of habeas
corpus as a constitutional right. Instead, the courts sanctioned those restric-
tions.98
a. Right of Option
The Supreme Court expressly upheld the military's restriction of the article
23 right to abandon the country. The Supreme Court had earlier characterized
the right of option as a constitutional guarantee that remained intact during a
state of siege and found that its denial violated article 23. 99 Nonetheless, in
the case of Marta Cristina Ercoli, the Supreme Court upheld the suspension
of the right of option pursuant to Laws 21.275 and 21.4 8 8. o
Ercoli was detained under the authority of a decree issued by the Per6n
government on December 3, 1975, and she asked to leave the country. 1 '
When the request was denied, as the military had since suspended the article
23 right of option, Ercoli submitted a petition of habeas corpus to enforce her
for 180 days. Law 21.568, promulgated Apr. 30, 1977, reprinted in XXXVII-B A.D.L.A. 1440 (1977).
97. The Institutional Act of September 1, 1977, reprinted in XXXVII-D A.D.L.A. 3664 (1977),
prolonged the suspension of the right of option, allowed the executive to carry out its article 23 power of
arrest in jails and military institutions, limited "travel areas" to the subject's home and gave the president
the power to determine whether a detained individual would be allowed to leave the country according to
the security needs of the nation. On the same day, the military government passed Resolution S/N, reprinted
in XXXVII-D A.D.L.A. 3668-(1977), which created a commission to assist the president in analyzing the
situation of th6se arrested pursuant to article 23 authority. Finally, the military established a permanent
review process for petitions from individuals who sought to exercise their article 23 right to leave the
country. Law 21.650, promulgated Sept. 26, 1977, reprinted in XXXVII-D A.D.L.A. 3746 (1977). For
further discussion of the military's restriction of the right of option, see N. SAGS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra
hote 8, at 286-90; Garro & Dahl, supra note 3, at 291-92 & n.26.
98. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of thejudiciary's ability to invalidate
a regulation on the grounds that it unconistitutiondlly restricted the process of habeas corpus.
99. Fernando Luis Chaves, 282 Fallos 63, 68-69 (1971).
100. 296 Fallos 372 (1976). For further discussion of the Ercoli decision, see N. SAGOts, HABEAs
CORPUS, supra note 8, at 287-88; Garro, supra note 3, at 322.
101. 296 Fallos at 374.
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right." z The federal court of first instance granted the petition and ordered
the government to allow Ercoli to leave Argentina within ten days. The Court
of Appeals upheld the decision, finding that to deny Ercoli's petition would
convert Ercoli's detention to an indefinite imprisonment and a punishment in
violation of article 23. The Court of Appeals gave the executive twenty days
to grant Ercoli's request." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Laws
21.275 and 21.448 constitutionally suspended the article 23 right of option for
a limited period."m  The Court based its decision on the premise that the
guarantees and rights established in the Argentine Constitution were not
absolute, but were subject to laws regulating their exercise. The Court rea-
soned that if all guarantees were subject to regulations, it need only look to
the authority granted the executive by article 23 in determining whether the
regulation in question was reasonable under the two-part test of Primera
Plana. 5 The Ercoli Court concluded that a suspension of the right of option
for a limited period was reasonable under the threat posed to the security of
the state by subversive activities.1"6
Three years later, in 1975, the Court again addressed the constitutionality
of Law 21.650 in the case of Benito Alberto Moya.10 7 Pursuant to a decree,
the government detained the nineteen year old Moya. 05 He twice petitioned
the Ministry of Interior, seeking to exercise his right to leave the country. The
Ministry of Interior denied the second petition under the authority of the
Institutional Act of September 1, 1977 and Law 21.650, justifying the denial
on the ground that Moya'bel6nged to a "band of delinquent terrorists acting
102. Id. at 372, 386.
103. Id. at 384.
104. Id. at 389-90.
105. Id. at 389.
106. Id. at 388, 390. The Argentine Supreme Court again addressed the constitutionality of the junta's
restriction on the right of option in the case of Jaime Lokman, 299 Fallos 142 (1977). Lokman, detained
pursuant to an executive order, brought a petition of habeas corpus to enforce his article 23 right of option.
The court of first instance denied the petition and was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeals of Cord6ba.
Id. at 145. Lokman brought an appeal to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of Law
21.275, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1040 (1976); Law 21.448, reprinted in XXXVI-D A.D.L.A.
2867 (1976); and Law 21.650, reprinted in XXXVII-D A.D.L.A. 3746 (1977). Unlike the Ercoli case,
Lokman challenged not only the temporary suspension of the right of option by Laws 21.275 and 21.448,
but the permanent regulation of the right by Law 21.650. The Supreme Court in Lokman found that
institutional acts enacted pursuant to the Process, such as Law 21.650, were integrated into the Argentine
Constitution, and would be sustained when based on a "true state of need" so long as the regulations under
the state of siege were reasonable. 299 Fallos at 145. The Court concluded that Law 21.650 restrictions
on article 23 were neither arbitrary nor irrational and upheld the lower courts' finding of reasonableness.
Id. at 146. For further discussion of the Lokman decision, see N. SAGO.s, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note
8, at 288.
107. Benito Alberto Moya, 303 Fallos 696, 698-99 (1981). For further discussion of the Moya
decision, see NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 411; Garro, supra note 3, at 323-24.
108. 303 Fallos at 707.
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in the Province of Tucuman."'" 9 Moya then brought a petition of habeas
corpus to enforce his article 23 right of option. The Federal Court of Bahfa
Blanca granted Moya's writ, holding that continued detention was an unconsti-
tutional restriction on his article 23 rights.'
The Supreme Court, on appeal, attempted to reconcile Moya's uncondi-
tional right of option, guaranteed by article 23, with the restrictions placed on
that right by Law 21.650. The Moya Court noted that a state of siege declara-
tion did not automatically suspend the article 23 right to leave the country
because the right limits the executive's power during a state of siege."'
However, the Court concluded that the executive's power to deny the right of
option (if the detained individual threatens the peace and security of the
nation), derived from Law 21.650, must be "harmonized" with the detainee's
article 23 rights. In order to "harmonize" Moya's unconditional right with the
executive's restriction of that right, the Supreme Court applied the reasonable-
ness test to the executive's actions."' The Court held that the executive
either had to allow Moya to abandon the country within fifteen days or reduce
his detention to a form that would be reasonable, namely, a condition of house
arrest." 3 On July 9, 1981, the military government complied with the Su-
preme Court's decision by releasing Moya from detention and placing him
under house arrest. 114
Thus the Supreme Court cautiously declined to investigate the constitution-
ality of any of the restrictions placed on the right of habeas corpus. Instead,
the Court chose to exercise an ineffectual "control of reasonableness" over the
junta's regulations and restrictions. The failure to directly challenge the
constitutionality of these regulations contributed to the systemic failure of the
habeas corpus process.
b. Judicial Review of Detentions Under the Executive's State of Siege
Powers
(i) Standard of Review for Article 23 Detentions
When the military took power in 1976, there were already many individuals
in prison who had been detained by the Per6n government. The number of
detainees increased dramatically under the military regime, and the courts were
109. Id.
110. The court overturned the denial of Moya's petition by the court of first instance. Id. at 703-04.
111. Id. at 708-09.
112. Id. at 711-12.
113. Id.
114. NUNcA MAS, supra note 1, at 411.
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soon faced with a flood of habeas corpus petitions.'l Earlier, the Supreme
Court had established in the Canovi decision that the judiciary could not
reverse the exercise of article 23 powers to arrest and transport unless the
executive transgressed article 23 limits."' The Court concluded that while
the act of arrest or transport could not be a "penalty or punishment," the
judiciary could not consider the reasonableness of the arrests themselves." 7
In the case of Carlos Mariano Zamorano, the Supreme Court returned to
the question of the applicable standard of review governing executive detention
of individuals during a state of siege."' Zamorano, a defense lawyer with
the Argentine League for Human Rights, was detained shortly after the Per6n
government declared a state of siege in 1974. Zamorano brought a habeas
corpus petition to challenge the reasonableness of his detention, alleging that
his detention amounted to a penalty or punishment." 9 The court of first
instance granted the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals requested
information concerning the grounds for the detention from the Ministry of
Interior."'2 The Ministry of Interior responded that Zamorano was held pur-
suant to a legitimate executive decree and that the reasons for the arrest stated
in the decree continued to exist. The Court of Appeals found that the response
was insufficient and thus upheld the grant of Zamorano's petition.12' The
Supreme Court took up the appeal while Zamorano remained in detention."
115. Id. at 403-04.
116. Ricardo Alberto Canovi, 278 Fallos 337, 340 (1972).
117. Id.
118. 298 Fallos 441 (1977). For further discussion of the Zamorano decision, see OAS REPORT, supra
note 3, at 229-34.
119. 298 Fallos 441, 442-43.
120. OAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 229-30, quoting the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion. The
decision of the Federal Court of Appeals is also quoted at length in I BULLETIN OF THE CENTRE FOR THE
INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 13-14, 36 (1978) [hereinafter BULLETIN].
121. The Court of Appeals held:
[i]t is not possible to accept the argument that the President of the Republic is alone empow-
ered to examine the situation of those who are detained at his order. Although it is clearly beyond
the scope of judicial activity ... it is equally clear that it is the duty of the Judiciary of the Nation
to examine exceptional cases such as the present as to the reasonableness of the measures taken
by the executive[,] and this is set out in Articles 23, 29, and 95 of the National Constitution ...
It is self-evident that if at the end of two years' [sic] of detention of a citizen the Administration
can show no other basis for this detention than the decree under which it was ordered, and if
such an extended period of time has not been used diligently by the Administration to collect
evidence against or in favor of the accused, this Court can only conclude that since there appear
to exist no elements showing that Carlos Mariano Zamorano is particularly dangerous and in view
of the time which has elapsed since his arrest, it would be unreasonable and unfounded to prolong
such a situation ... Although it is evident that the factual information giving rise to the State of
Siege continues in its entirety, this in itself is not sufficient to justify the extension of the
detentions for such lengthy periods of time that they transform the exceptional character of the
procedure in question into what is really a penal sanction.
BULLETIN, supra note 120, at 14.
122. Due to Law 21.312, promulgated May 4, 1976, reprinted in XXXVI-B A.D.L.A. 1097 (1976),
detainees whose habeas corpus petitions were granted by a lower court remained in detention until the final
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The Court in Zamorano held for the first time that the judiciary could
consider the exercise of the power to arrest and transport by the executive, but
only to the extent that the judiciary could assess the reasonableness of restric-
tions of liberty."Z The Court adopted the standard from the amparo decisions
of So/Ta and Primera Plana, the standard that had not been applied to article
23 detentions in the decisions of Trossi and Canovi.'24 The Zamorano Court
concluded that to be able to exercise the control of reasonableness, it needed
precise information on the reason for the arrest and its relation to the state of
siege, and therefore ordered the executive to provide precise information
regarding Zamorano's detention.'11 The decision, however, was not much
help to Zamorano. The executive provided the Court, exparte, with informa-
tion of Zamorano's communist contacts. Based on this uncontested evidence,
the Court reversed the order of release and denied Zamorano's habeas corpus
petition. 126
The Supreme Court applied the Zamorano analysis to free a detainee only
once during the military dictatorship. 7 The habeas corpus case of Jacobo
Timerman became internationally known and discussed as an example of the
success of the habeas corpus process during Argentina's military dictatorship.
However, human rights scholars discussing the Timerman case are quick to
point out the peculiarities that set it apart from the thousands of unsuccessful
habeas corpus petitions during that period.' First, Timerman was the well-
known and influential editor of La Opini6n, a Buenos Aires daily newspaper.
Second, Timerman was detained under a specific allegation that provided the
judiciary with' grounds for determining whether his lengthy detention was
justified.'29 Third, Timerman's cause became internationally known and the
military junta was subject to widespread pressure from international organiza-
tions and foreign governments, including President Carter and members of the
U.S. Congress.'"
Timerman was arrested on April 21, 1977, under Executive Decree
1093/77, allegedly because of his association with David Graiver, the publisher
of La Opini6n.' Graiver, who died in an airplane accident earlier that
appeal. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
123. 298 Fallos 441, 444.
124. See supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
125. 298 Fallos at 445.
126. OAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 230-31.
127. Id. at 231.
128. See, e.g., Garro, supra note 3, at 332-33; Snyder, supra note 3, at 516-17.
129. G. CARRI6, EL CASO TzMERMAN (1987). Genaro Carri6 acted as Timerman's lawyer throughout
the two year process of litigation and appeals to advance his habeas corpus petition. Carri6 describes the
litigation and presents copies of all documents submitted to and decisions received from the courts involved.
130. Garro, supra note 3, at 332.
131. Snyder, supra note 3, at 515.
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month, had been accused by the military of laundering funds for a terrorist
group known as the "Montoneros."' 32 On the day following Timerman's
arrest, his wife commenced a habeas corpus action, claiming the arrest was
arbitrary and had no reasonable basis in law."' In response to the court's
request for information,. the Ministry of Interior declared that Timerman was
arrested pursuant to the executive's article 23 powers and that his connection
to Graiver was under investigation by a Special Military War Council.'
Timerman remained in custody while his habeas corpus petition was pend-
ing. 13' The petition was denied by the court of first instance and then by the
federal court of appeals. 136 By the time the petition reached the Supreme
Court, the Special Military War Council had tried and acquitted Timerman for
his alleged participation in the Graiver matter. 37 The Commander of the
First Army Corps informed the Supreme Court that Timerman would remain
in detention pursuant to Decree 1093/77.13
The Supreme Court found Timerman's continued detention unconstitu-
tional.' 39 The Court held that the executive must exercise its article 23 pow-
ers in an established and reasonable manner and declared that the judiciary
(particularly the Supreme Court, as the court charged with protecting constitu-
tional guarantees), is competent to control the executive exercise of state of
siege powers. A state of siege, the Court found, is an extreme and transitory
recourse meant to preserve, not extinguish, the Constitution. Therefore, the
executive must, at the request of a competent judge, provide enough informa-
tion on each concrete case to allow a court to apply the "control of reasonable-
ness. 
"140
To exercise this control, the Timerman Court resorted to the standard of
reasonableness established in Primera Plana and held that there are two facets
of the examination of reasonableness: first, an examination of the relation
between the affected constitutional guarantee and the state of interior commo-
tion; and second, verification of whether the restricting method is proportionate
to the ends sought by the state of siege. ' 4' Applying this standard, the Court
found that under the generic explanation of Decree 1093/77 Timerman's arrest
132. Id. at 515.
133. G. CARRI6, supra note 129, at 9 (entire petition and its amendments reproduced asAnexos 1-3,
5).
134. Id. at 9; see also Jacobo Timerman, 306 Fallos 816, 820 (1978).
135. Timerman was interrogated and tortured while in custody. For Timerman's description of his
experiences, see J. TMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER (T. Talbot trans.
1981).
136. G. CARRI6, supra note 129, at 21-22, 38-40.
137. 71merman, 300 Fallos at 822.
138. Id. at 820.
139. Id. at 822.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 819-20.
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"bears a direct and immediate relationship to the causes that prompted the state
of siege," but did not provide a reasonable basis for Timerman's continued
detention.14 The Court further noted that if Timerman were arrested due to
his alleged involvement in the Graiver matter, and if the War Council had
acquitted him in this matter, the reason for his arrest and detention would no
longer exist.143
The Supreme Court's decision, however, did not free Timerman. He was
placed under house arrest by virtue of a resolution issued by the military
junta.'" The Supreme Court refused to determine the constitutionality of the
resolution because its validity had not been challenged by the habeas corpus
petition brought by Timerman's wife. Timerman then filed a second petition
for habeas corpus, which also reached the Supreme Court.145 The Court
concluded that the reasons for Timerman's detention stated in the executive's
resolution were not reasonably related to the causes of the state of siege, and
thus the detention amounted to a punishment not authorized by article 23.146
(ii) Application of the Reasonableness Standard
While the Zamorano, Timerman and Moya decisions established a reason-
ableness standard of judicial review over arrests ordered by the executive
during a state of siege, Argentine courts did not apply the standard to affect
the release of any individuals. 47 The courts generally accepted the exec-
utive's assertion that an individual's link to subversive activities constituted
a well-founded basis for detention.
One representative example of this is the case of Hebe Margarita Tizio. 141
Tizio was detained on May 14, 1976, pursuant to an executive decree. On
August 10, Tizio solicited permission from the Ministry of Interior to leave
the country. The petition was denied, and Tizio's father brought a habeas
corpus petition on her behalf challenging the reasonableness of her continued
detention. 49 The court of first instance denied the petition, declaring that it
could not question the motives for the detention. The Court of Appeals upheld
the decision, finding that the length of the detention was not unreasonable and
did not convert the arrest to a penalty or punishment in violation of article
142. Id. at 822.
143. Id.
144. G. CARR16, supra note 129, at 41.
145. Jacobo Timerman, 301 Fallos 771 (1979).
146. Id. at 782-83.
147. See also Garro, supra note 3, at 330.
148. 299 Fallos 294 (1977).
149. Id. at 295-96.
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23.150 On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the Zamorano reasonableness
standard. The Ministry of Interior had informed the Court that Tizio was being
detained because she was "linked to subversive activities."'' The Court
found that the assertion satisfied the duty of the executive to provide the courts
with detailed information concerning the reasons for an individual's detention,
as required by Zamorano. The Tizio Court concluded that once information
concerning subversive activity had been provided, the executive decision to
arrest or transport was irreversible.'52
In numerous other cases following Zamorano, lower courts granted writs
of habeas corpus on the grounds that the executive's generic assertions, justify-
ing the detention on the detainee's connections with subversive elements, did
not comply with the reasonableness standard elaborated in Zamorano and
Timerman. In all these cases, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts,
finding that once the executive claimed the detained individual was involved
in "subversive activity," the decision to arrest was within the article 23 discre-
tion of the executive.5 3 Thus the Supreme Court refused to implement the
Zamorano standard of reasonableness in reviewing detentions, holding that
these executive actions were de facto nonjusticiable political questions.
150. Id. at 296.
151. Id. at 297.
152. See also Enrique Perelmuter, 301 Fallos 866 (1989). Perelmuter, detained pursuant to executive
order, brought a habeas corpus petition challenging his continued detention. The court of first instance
requested information regarding the detention from the executive, and the Subsecretary of the Interior
responded that Perelmuter was detained for being "a participant in criminal activities against the state,
characterized by action in secret cellular organizations designed to obtain financial resources to use in favor
of subversive elements." Id. at 33-34. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Perelmuter's habeas
corpus petition, determining that the executive acted within its article 23 powers. Id. at 34. The Court
expressly adopted the argument of the Attorney General that the information provided by the Ministry of
the Interior constituted sufficient information to comply with the rationality standard adopted in Zamorano
and Timerman. Id.
153. See, e.g., Edith Staheli de Frias, 301 Fallos 867 (1980) (Supreme Court reversed lower court's
sentence ordering the freedom of Staheli de Frias, as it found executive's report stating cause of detention
sufficient to meet rationality standard of Zamorano and Timernan).
In 1983, the Supreme Court, securely independent from the weakened military junta, used the
Zamorano reasonableness standard to negate restrictions placed on the return to the country of ex-Senator
Yrigoyen. Hip6lito Solari Yrigoyen, 305 Fallos 269 (1983). Ex-Senator Yrigoyen was arrested on
September 1, 1976, on the basis that his activities "threatened interior peace and public order." Id. at 276.
On April 25, 1977, Yrigoyen exercised his right to abandon the country. Yrigoyen subsequently initiated
a habeas corpus petition seeking to overturn the executive decree that allowed him to abandon the country
on the condition that he never return. The Supreme Court found that the executive's regulation of the
exercise of the right of option was subject to the judicial control of reasonableness. 305 Fallos at 299. The
Court held that the arrest order did not establish a rational relation between Yrigoyen's exclusion and the
motives that prompted the state of siege, and ordered the executive to lift all restrictions on Yrigoyen's
return. Id. at 280. For further description of the brutal treatment of Yrigoyen and ex-Representative Amaya
while they were under executive detention, see NUNCA Mks, supra note 1, at 249. For additional informa-
tion on the brutality suffered under executive detention, see OAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 155-63.
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2. The Effectiveness of Habeas Corpus Process
a. The Problem of Executive Noncompliance
The military's noncompliance with the habeas corpus process was manifest,
systematic and overwhelming. The investigations by the Organization for
American States' Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and the report
of the Comisi6n Nacional Sobre la Desaparaci6n de Personas (CONADEP),
revealed in case after case a systematic practice in which the military respond-
ed to judicial requests for information concerning detainees by asserting that
the evidence was confidential.154 The Federal Court of Appeals of Buenos
Aires, which conducted the trial of former members of the military junta on
charges of human rights abuses, noted that "the defendants deliberately con-
cealed the facts from the courts, from the families of the victims, from national
and foreign institutions and organizations, from the Church, from the govern-
ments of foreign countries, and from society at large." 55 In short, the patent-
ly false and obstructive reports submitted to the courts by the military in the
majority of habeas corpus investigations successfully hid the military's illegal
activities from the judiciary and the Argentine public.
b. The Problem of Judicial Independence
The Argentine courts facilitated the abuse and manipulation of the protect-
ions designed to be a part of the habeas corpus process.' 56 Argentine judges,
for the most part, did not assert their power of investigation. Instead, judges
accepted the security force's routine statements that the person sought was not
in detention. In none of the reported cases did the judges of first instance go
to the security forces' headquarters or to the reported detention sites. 57 In
spite of overwhelming evidence of the existence of illegal detention centers,
no special methods of investigation were used, and the courts accepted the
military's denials as fact. In the final moments of the dictatorship, some courts
assigned habeas corpus cases to special investigation magistrates, but the
magistrates likewise failed to penetrate the wall of executive denial.15
154. OAS REPORT, supra note 3, at 245; NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 479.
155. Judgment on Human Rights, supra note 13, at 333-34 (1986).
156. NUNcA MAS, supra note 1, at 404. The report nonetheless acknowledged that "there were judges
who, in the face of tremendous pressure, carried out their duties with the dignity and decency expected
of them." Sadly, the report found that most members of thejudiciary exhibited complicity and indifference.
Id. at 392, 404.
157. ld. at 404.
158. Id. The investigations of national criminal judges for the crime of illegal deprivation of liberty,
while not leading to the discovery of disappeared persons, did provide much of the evidence used in trials
of military commanders for human rights abuses. See Nifio Interview, supra note 87.
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In Perez de Smith, the Supreme Court heard a consolidated habeas corpus
petition on behalf of 1,542 detainees whose individual petitions had been
rejected by the lower courts. 159 The families asked the Court to accept origi-
nal jurisdiction in the petition and to intervene directly. The Supreme Court
declined to do so, citing articles 100 and 101 of the Argentine Constitu-
tion. 160 The Court requested that the executive "intensify the investigations
into the whereabouts and situations of those persons whose disappearances had
been denounced before the courts."16 The Pdrez de Smith Court further
exhorted lower court judges to "exhaust all judicial procedures of the institution
of habeas corpus established in the Constitution and in the law." 6 Finally,
the Court declared that the refusal of public authorities to cooperate with
judges amounted to a "miscarriage of justice." '
The executive's failure to respond prompted the renewal of the petition
before the Supreme Court on three separate occasions. 64 The Supreme Court
continued to decline jurisdiction, but in its third decision, the Court stated:
Miscarriage ofjustice not only takes place when people are precluded from resorting
to the courts of justice, or when a court decision is unreasonably delayed; it also
arises when judges are unable to exercise those powers with the effectiveness
demanded by the legal order. The legal system cannot be enforced without the aide
of the courts, which are entrusted by the National Constitution to decide cases
brought before them. These considerations are especially pertinent in the case at
bar, where basic human rights are at stake."
These supplications had little or no effect on the fate of the disappeared.
The Supreme Court holdings in the cases of Inks Ollero,166 Osvaldo
CUsar Georgi,167 Roberto Grunbaum168 and Celia Sara Machado169 simi-
larly failed to produce results. In these cases, the Court reiterated its holding
in Pdrez de Smith, remanding the petitions to the appropriate lower courts and
instructing them to conduct additional investigations. 7 °
159. 297 Fallos 338 (1977). For additional discussion of this case, see NUNCA MAs, supra note 1,
at 404; N. SAG0"s, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 421-23, 489; Garro, supra note 3, at 335-36;
Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 122-23 & nn.14-16.
160. 297 Fallos at 340. Articles 100 and 104 of the Argentine Constitution establish when the Supreme
Court may exercise original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction.
161. 297 Fallos at 341.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 340.
164. Habeas corpus petitions have no res judicata effects and can be repeated with the hope that the
person may later be discovered in a detention center run by the executive or military authorities. The Perez
de Smith petition was renewed on July 20, 1978, 300 Fallos 832; December 21, 1978, 300 Fallos 1282;
and December 26, 1980, 302 Fallos 1680.
165. 300 Fallos 1282, 1286 (1978).
166. 300 Fallos 457 (1978).
167. 301 Fallos 143 (1979).
168. 301 Fallos 1047 (1979).
169. 302 Fallos 772 (1980)
170. In~s Ollero, 300 Fallos at 460-61; Osualdo Cdsar Georgi, 301 Fallos at 145; Roberto Grunbaum,
301 Fallos at 1048; Celia Sara Machado, 302 Fallos at 781-82.
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In Ollero, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of a habeas corpus petition
that had been rejected by lower courts despite substantial evidence of the
detention by security forces. 171 The Court acknowledged that if the relevant
security force denied any knowledge of the person in whose favor the petition
was brought, the Court could do little. The Court nonetheless found that the
petition presented "proofs that formed a serious presumption" that Ollero was
detained by military authorities.172 The Court stated that habeas corpus "was
created to restore liberty immediately to those deprived of it and to do so the
[C]ourt must take the steps necessary to make it efficient."' The Supreme
Court concluded that in the face of the prima facie evidence presented in the
Ollero petition, the court must broaden the investigation. 74
The petition of Osvaldo Cdsar Georgi was also unsuccessful. In 1978,
Alfredo Antonio Georgi was taken from his workplace by a group of unidenti-
fied armed individuals. 75 Georgi's father brought a habeas corpus petition
seeking his release, but military authorities denied any knowledge of Georgi's
whereabouts, and the petition was dismissed. Georgi's father then directly peti-
tioned the Supreme Court to intervene. While urging that the lower court
conduct full investigations, the Supreme Court held that under the Argentine
Constitution and the Pgrez de Smith decision, the Court had no original
jurisdiction over the case. 76
In Roberto Grunbaum, the Supreme Court again urged lower courts to
broaden their investigations into the facts underlying habeas corpus petitions.
Grunbaum was detained in his home in the presence of his father on June 16,
1977, by a group of persons claiming to be members of the security forc-
es.'" The Grunbaum Court repeated its holding in Georgi that "habeas cor-
pus was created to immediately restore liberty."178 The Court found that the
171. 300 Fallos at 460. Cdsar Ollero brought the petition on behalf of his daughter, who disappeared
from Buenos Aires in 1978.
172. Id. at 460.
173. Id. at 461.
174. Id. at 460-61. After the Court's remand, no further information on Ollero's whereabouts was
discovered and the petition was eventually dismissed. See Snyder, supra note 3, at 517.
175. 301 Fallos at 143. According to evidence later obtained from the testimony of eyewitnesses,
Georgi was held at various clandestine camps under the authority of the military and the federal police.
Id.
176. Id. Georgi's petition was converted into a criminal complaint for the illegitimate deprivation of
liberty and was eventually heard in the Federal Court of Tucum~n. On May 8, 1980, the case was dismissed
for lack of evidence after all inquiries submitted to the military failed to produce evidence of Georgi's
whereabouts. The dismissal was upheld by the Federal Chamber of Appeals and Correctional Division,
and eventually by the Supreme Court. Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 120, 123 & n.18,
124 & n.22.
177. 301 Fallos at 1047, 1049. Grunbaum's father brought a habeas corpus petition to seek knowledge
of his son's whereabouts and the reason for his detention. The judge of the court of first instance dismissed
the petition without having received a response from the Armed Forces. Id.
178. Id. at 1049.
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judge of the court of first instance "could have and should have broadened the
investigation, adopting the means necessary to duly clarify whether the benefi-
ciary of the habeas corpus was detained at some time and place by public
functionaries.' 79 Following the Grunbaum decision in 1979, the Supreme
Court issued a number of decisions in which it criticized the brief investiga-
tions of the lower courts and remanded cases for further inquiries. 0 Despite
these decisions and the Perez de Smith, Ollero and Georgi cases, the process
of habeas corpus remained an entirely ineffective method of obtaining informa-
tion concerning disappeared individuals.
In addition to being ineffective, the judicial treatment of habeas corpus
petitions harmed the public image of the judiciary. The CONADEP report
found that during the military dictatorship, the judiciary "became a sham
jurisdictional structure, a cover to protect its image," creating the impression
that the rule of law was functioning when in fact its protections were useless
against the military.'' The report concluded that "the formal way in which
habeas corpus was implemented operated in practice like the other face of
disappearance."182
The habeas corpus petitions decided during the dictatorship had two
significant consequences. First, the courts began to exercise judicial review
over detentions ordered by the executive during a state of siege using the
Zamorano reasonable relation standard. While the exercise of judicial review
did not lead to the granting of more habeas corpus writs, it did begin to expose
the lawlessness of the military regime. Second, the decisions established the
principles of an executive duty to cooperate, a judicial duty to investigate, and
the power of the courts to make demands on the executive. Nonetheless, none
of the Supreme Court's pronouncements led to the discovery and return of a
single disappeared person. Despite the filing of thousands of habeas corpus
petitions and the overwhelming evidence of military involvement in the disap-
pearances, not one habeas corpus petition yielded information concerning
disappeared individuals. All the actions of the judiciary and the subsequent
attempts at habeas corpus reform must be measured against this sobering
failure.
179. Id. at 1050.
180. See, e.g., Celia Sara Machado, 302 Fallos 772 (1980); Herndn G. Nuguer, 302 Fallos 864
(1980); Cristina Diez, 302 Fallos 964 (1980); Emilio Horacio Ogando, 302 Fallos 967 (1980); Georgina
Serga Simerman de Herra, 302 Fallos 1097 (1980); Raul Osvaldo Ocampo, 302 Fallos 1112 (1980); Hdctor
Hidalgo Sold, 1982-C L.L. 108 (1982).
181. NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 803.
182. Id. at 804.
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Iml. REFORM OF HABEAS CORPUS AFTER THE DICTATORSHIP
A. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1984
On September 19, 1984, Senator Fernando de la Rda introduced Law
23.098 ("Habeas Corpus Act"), which was intended to reform and consolidate
the regulations governing the process of habeas corpus."8 3 The Act addressed
both the antiquated habeas corpus regulations and confused legal standards used
by Argentine courts during the military dictatorship. 8 4 While not significant-
ly confronting the wholesale failure of habeas corpus during the dictatorship,
the Habeas Corpus Act did accomplish several major reforms in the habeas
corpus process: it explicitly addressed the relationship between the judiciary
and the executive during a state of siege (article 4); it established habeas
corpus as a constitutionally based procedure (article 1); it expanded the juris-
diction, scope, and standing of habeas corpus procedures and the de office
powers of judges (articles 2-6); and it regulated habeas corpus procedures in
general (articles 8-26).
1. Article 4: Regulation of Habeas Corpus During a State of Siege
Article 4 is the most important and innovative feature of the Habeas Corpus
Act because it establishes a national standard for the treatment of habeas
corpus petitions for persons detained under an executive state of siege."8 5
Given the frequent imposition of states of siege, judicial control of executive
detentions pursuant to state of siege powers is crucial to any realistic re-
form.186
Article 4 provides that a judge must verify the following when reviewing
habeas corpus petitions:
1) Clause 1: the legitimacy of the declaration of the state of siege;
2) Clause 2: the correlation between the detainment order and the cause
of the state of siege;
183. N. SAofts, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8. For a list of authorities discussing the Habeas Corpus
Act, see supra note 8.
184. FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2029. Senator de la Rta stated that "[h]abeas corpus, applied
by an independent judicial power, will enable a more rapid material and ethical reconstruction of our coun-
try, a proposal ... shared by all Argentinians who hope for a democracy effective in the mark of the law
and the respect of the dignity of man." Id. at 2033. De la Rla introduced a similar project in 1973, but
the project was sent to the General Legislation Committee and never reached the full Senate. Id. at 2029,
2033.
185. See N. SAGOS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 233 ("[article 4] constitutes in some aspects
an audacious step forward"); D'Albora, supra note 8, at 973 (article 4 leaves behind traditional Supreme
Court temperament that avoided questioning executive action taken during state of siege).
186. FUNDAMENToS, supra note 38, at 2032-33.
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3) Clause 3: the form or conditions of detention;
4) Clause 4: the practical availability of the right of option (voluntary
exile) to the detainee.
The first clause of article 4 reverses the traditional position of the Supreme
Court that a declaration of a state of siege is a political question and, as such,
is nonjusticiable. "7 The clause empowers the judiciary to review actions by
the executive and legislature taken pursuant to their constitutional authority to
declare a state of siege.
Clause 1 creates a separation of powers problem between the judiciary, the
executive, and the legislature. In completing the review provided for in clause
1, a court reviewing a habeas corpus petition might impinge on the competency
of the other branches, for example, by examining the validity of a declaration
of a state of siege. However, so long as the court determines only whether a
state of siege was declared by constitutionally permissible means and does not
examine whether existing conditions merit the declaration, the judiciary will
be within the constitutional exercise of its powers.
Clause 2 codifies the standard of reasonableness for the review of deten-
tions developed by Argentine courts in the 1970s. The Zamorano, Timerman
and Moya cases established the duty of the judiciary in reviewing habeas
corpus petitions to ensure that executive detentions during a state of siege were
reasonably related to the causes that gave rise to-the state of siege.' The
Act does not resolve the conflict between these cases and others (e.g., Tizio
and Perelmuter), in which the Supreme Court found that an executive assertion
that individuals were detained pursuant to the state of siege was sufficient to
meet the reasonableness standard."8 9 The Habeas Corpus Act fails to establish
the degree of deference the judiciary should pay to the executive when the
executive provides reasons for detentions. The Act does not elaborate on the
187. See, e.g., discussions of Sofia, supra notes 58-64, and Zamorano, supra notes 118-26, and
accompanying text. In the legislative debate prior to the passing of the Habeas Corpus Act, Senator Menem
argued that the declaration of a state of siege was left by the Constitution to the president and Congress
and was not suited to judicial scrutiny. He argued that article 4, clause 1 was too broad and proposed
amending the provision to clarify the limits ofyjudicial examination of legitimacy. Senator de la Rga
responded that the clause was not directed towran examination of the need for or the decision to declare
a state of siege, but rather was an examination of whether the state of siege was declared in the manner
established by the Constitution. He gave the example of a state of siege declared by the executive while
Congress was in session or for a reason other than foreign attack or internal disorder. He also explained
that while the judiciary could assure that the stated reason for the declaration was foreign attack or internal
disorder, the judiciary could not examine whether the attack or disorder actually existed or was sufficient
to merit the declaration of a state of siege. FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2038. Despite de la Rda's
interpretation of the clause, D'Albora feels that the judiciary may use the clause to ascertain whether the
existing conditions actually constitute a state of "internal disorder." D'Albora, supra note 8, at 973.
Bisserier and Tal6n agree with Senator Menem that article 4, clause 1 of the Act should be clarified to set
out the exact role of the judiciary. P. BISSERIER & F. TAL6N, supra note 8, at 38-41.
188. See supra notes 118-46 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
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degree to which the presiding judge must scrutinize the reasons given by the
executive and does not allow for evidence to disprove these reasons.
Clause 3 establishes that during a state of siege habeas corpus also exists
to protect against the unconstitutional deterioration of conditions for those
legitimately detained.,19 The clause thereby provides a mechanism to ensure
that any executive detention during a state of siege does not amount to a
punishment or conviction as prohibited by article 23 of the Argentine Consti-
tution. Under clause 3 a detainee could, for example, challenge the constitu-
tionality of restrictive measures of detention, interrogation and fact gathering,
such as those established by the military during the dictatorship.
Finally, clause 4 gives the judge authority to determine the constitutionality
of any impediment to the free exercise of the article 23 right of option. The
right of option, along with the prohibition on punishment or conviction, forms
the main constitutional control over executive detentions. During the dictator-
ship, the judiciary upheld the constitutionality of the many restrictions placed
by the military on the right of option.191 Clause 4, however, requires the
judiciary to review any restriction placed on the article 23 right of option. The
clause fails to indicate what, if any, restrictions could be tolerated but creates
a presumption that any restrictions placed on the right of option are unconstitu-
tional.
2. Article 1: Constitutional Consolidation of Habeas Corpus
Article 1 establishes habeas corpus as a constitutionally based process by
removing the federal habeas corpus regulations from the Criminal Procedure
Code and establishing it as a separate "special law."'9 Since the procedure
directing the application of national substantive laws (e.g., the civil code, the
criminal code) is determined by provincial legislatures, this change increases
the potential power of all courts to oversee the habeas corpus process. When
habeas corpus regulations were originally codified as a part of the Criminal
Procedure Code, review was strictly limited to monitoring illegal detentions
by public authorities. Rather than adhering to this rigid criminal code based
on a nineteenth century inquisitional model, courts are now allowed to apply
190. N. SAGOs, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 283.
191. See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
192. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 28. For further discussion of the significance of the removal, see
FuNDAMENros, supra note 38, at 2030; N. SAGOS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 112-13, 116-17;
Bertolino, supra note 8, at 676, 679; D'Albora, supra note 8, at 971-72. The "special law" governing
habeas corpus is similar to the law regulating the amparo process. See FUNDAMENTos, supra note 38, at
2031. Some scholars have suggested creating a Code of Constitutional Procedural Rights that would include
habeas corpus, amparo and other similar procedures for the enforcement of constitutional norms. Bertolino,
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constitutional standards to the habeas corpus process. 193 Habeas corpus can
now be used to challenge actions that violate general constitutional norms. 94
Article 1 also states that if the habeas corpus process, as developed in provin-
cial constitutions and laws, provides greater protections than the Habeas
Corpus Act, the stricter local provisions are to be applied. 195 The Act thus
serves as a national constitutional minimum.'
3. Articles 2-6: Justiciability Requirements
a. Jurisdiction
Article 2 establishes jurisdictional limits by stating that jurisdiction depends
on whether the alleged injurious act emanated from a federal or provincial
authority. 197 If the petitioner is not sure of the origin of the injurious act,
article 2 allows the petition to be brought in any court until the authority
responsible for the injury is known.' 98 This division of jurisdiction between
federal and provincial courts is problematic given the limited access to federal
courts in the interior of the country.' 9
b. Scope
The Habeas Corpus Act significantly expanded the scope of habeas corpus.
Article 3 establishes that a writ of habeas corpus is available not only for the
traditional purpose of challenging detentions, but also for challenging the threat
of detention and the worsening of conditions of legitimate detentions. 2' This
expansion of scope has been responsible for the largest number of habeas
corpus petitions during the four years since the passage of the Act.2 '
193. N. SAG0 s, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 112-13.
194. Bertolino, supra note 8, at 676; D'Albora, supra note 8, at 972. Bertolino considers that the
"most significant change attributable to the [Habeas Corpus Act] is ... the field recently denominated as
'Constitutional Procedural Right,' the systematic area where the lawplaces habeas corpus." Bertolino, supra
note 8, at 676.
195. FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2030, 2036, 2038, 2041.
196. See P. BISSErIER & F. TAL6N, supra note 8, at 28-31; N. SAG6s, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note
8, at 123; Bertolino, supra note 8, at 675; D'Albora, supra note 8, at 974.
197. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 2.
198. Id.
199. FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2042-43. Senator Laferrierre argued in the legislative debate
that basing jurisdiction on whether the authority responsible for the injurious act was federal or provincial
could lead to a serious gap in the protection of habeas corpus in the outlying provinces. He offered as an
example an individual detained by federal authorities in the border area of the northeast province of
Misiones where the closest federal judge would be in the provincial capital of Posadas, some 300 kilometers
away, making immediate judicial relief impossible to obtain. Id.
200. See P. BISSERIER & F. TAL6N, supra note 8, at 36-38.
201. Nifio Interview, supra note 87.
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c. Standing
Article 5 provides that a petition of habeas corpus may be brought by any
person on his or her own behalf or on behalf of another."' This standard
perpetuates the preexistent rule found in article 622, which states that a
"petition of Habeas Corpus may be offered by the detained person or by
another in his name."2" Article 5 improves this standard by providing that
a petition may be brought "in favor" of the affected individual instead of "in
the name of" the affected individual. This change eliminates the implication
of Article 622 that the petitioner must be authorized by the affected individual
to act in his or her name.2"
d. Judicial Power
Article 6 empowers the judiciary to declare de office that a detention is
invalid because its underlying law was unconstitutional.2 5 During the dicta-
torship, courts could not rule on the constitutionality of the laws or decrees
under which detentions were ordered, based on the doctrine that, as a penal
process, habeas corpus did not give courts jurisdiction to investigate the
constitutionality of the laws and decrees.2 6
4. Articles 8-26: Habeas Corpus Procedures
The habeas corpus process created by the Habeas Corpus Act largely
follows that of former articles 617-645 of the Criminal Procedure Code, with
some notable exceptions:
a. Parties Involved
The Habeas Corpus Act affects all parties involved in the process, namely:
judges, prosecutor, detainees, third party petitioners, and the authority named
in the petition. Article 8 removes the restrictive rule of competence established
202. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 5.
203. C6DIGo PROC. PENAL at art. 622. During the dictatorship, the military narrowed this permissive
standard. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
204. N. SAGOS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 303.
205. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 6.
206. D'Albora, supra note 8, at 974. Article 11 of the Habeas Corpus Act also provides that when
a court or judge of competentjurisdiction has reliable knowledge that a detainee will be transported outside
the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable harm, the judge may order the individual to be brought
before the judge to resolve the situation. FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2027. The power of a judge
to issue a de office writ is consistent with the broad standard in article 5 for standing to bring a habeas
corpus petition.
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during the dictatorship by Law 22.383 and makes both national and federal
judges in the capital and all judges in the interior competent to hear habeas
corpus petitions. 7 Article 21 requires that the public prosecutor be notified
of every petition received; the prosecutor can then intervene at any stage to
protect the process. 2 8 Article 25 requires the presence of both the affected
individual and a representative of the detaining authority at an oral hearing;
the former has the right to an attorney. Article 22 provides the petitioner the
right to intervene with the assistance of an attorney at any stage of the process
including the oral hearing, but the petitioner does not have the same rights as
the other parties to the proceedings.2 9 Finally, article 11 requires the judge
to send a writ ordering the named authority to produce the affected individual
within a given period. The named authority must then respond immediately
by producing both the affected individual and a report on the factual situation
surrounding the detention.
b. The Petition
Article 9 requires a petitioner to staie the authority responsible for the
detention or threat, the cause or pretext of the injurious act, and a statement
of the illegitimacy of the act.21° Unlike the former law, article 9 allows the
petitioner to provide the facts as they are best known even if some information
is still missing. A court cannot dismiss habeas corpus petitions for mistakes
in form but must take the steps necessary to acquire needed information.2 '
207. Both article 618 and its revision by Law 22.383 limited the number of federal judges competent
to hear petitions in the interior to those presiding in criminal courts. C6DIGO PROC. PENAL at art. 618; Law
22.383, promulgated Jan. 28, 1981, reprinted in XLI-A A.D.L.A. (1981). Article 8 is thus a compromise
between the restrictive competence rule of Law 22.383 and the desire by some for universal competence
for judges to entertain habeas corpus petitions. Compare N. SAGf0S, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at
324-35 (article 8 equitable as it limits judges who will have necessary expertise) with P. BISSERIER & F.
TAL6N, supra note 8, at 31-34 (need for availability and choice of magistrates requires making all judges
competent to hear petitions).
208. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 21. In Argentina, the ministeriopablico or the ministeriopiblicoflscal
is a position much like the office of district attorney in the United States. However, in the civil law system,
the position is more related to the judicial branch than is the corresponding position in common law
systems. For this reason the author translates the position as "public prosecutor." Senator de la Ra,
introducing the legislation, made it clear that the role envisioned for a public prosecutor was not to defend
the authority responsible for the challenged injury, but rather to fulfill the "function of controller of
legality." FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2031-32. See infra Section IV.B.6 for a discussion contrasting
the role of a public prosecutor with that of an ombudsman.
209. The petitioner, however, is limited by article 22 to an appeal challenging a contrary award of
costs or sanctions. There is no obligation for the court or other parties to give the petitioner any of the
required notifications. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 12.
210. Id. at art. 9.
211. Id. See also N. SAGOtS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 372-73.
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c. The Writ
The Habeas Corpus Act reduces the rambling writ provisions of articles
619-24 of the prior Criminal Procedure Code to two succinct articles. 212
Article 11 requires the judge to order the named authority to present the
detained individual and to report the reasons for the detention.213 Article 11
further requires that the writ be sent in writing unless the judge considers it
necessary to appear personally at the detainee's location. If the judge goes to
the place of detention, he or she may give the order orally, but must leave
proof of having done S0.214 Finally, article 11 mandates that if the authority
responsible for the detention ignores the order, the judge must deliver the order
to the superiors of that authority." 5
d. The Hearing and Decision
One of the most substantial reforms of the Habeas Corpus Act is the oral
hearing requirement.2"6 A major problem during the dictatorship was the
summary nature of the procedure. Judges would consider and dismiss petitions
solely because the security forces denied that the individual was being held or
the executive asserted that the individual was being held for participating in
subversive activity. Petitioners or detained individuals were not given .the
opportunity to appear before the judge, present arguments or offer evidence.
Articles 14-18 of the Act create a process of oral hearing that addresses these
past failures, including the opportunity to testify (article 14), to present evi-
dence (article 15), and to receive an immediate final decision (article 17).217
e. Costs and Sanctions
Article 23 provides that when a petition is granted, the costs of the proce-
dure will be charged to' the functionary responsible for the injurious act.218
212. See C6DIGO PROC. PENAL at arts. 619-24.
213. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 11. The role of the written report is significantly less important under
the Act, with its provision for an oral hearing, than under the previous regulations of articles 630-31. See
C6DIGO PROC. PENAL at arts. 630-31.
214. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 11.
215. Article 12 requires the named authority to comply with the writ immediately or within the period
set by the judge, and the judge must rule expressly on compliance. Id. at art. 12.
216. De la Rta, when introducing the legislation, stated that the most important procedural innovation
of the new law was the requirement of an oral hearing. He felt that the oral hearing was the most effective
means of protecting the habeas corpus right. FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2031. See also P. BISSERIER
& F. TAL6N, supra note 8, at 56-57; N. SAGOts, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 429-30.
217. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 17.
218. Id. However, in the case of article 6 (de office declaration of unconstitutionality) decisions, the
costs must be borne by the party who incurred them. This provision corresponds to the idea that an existing
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When a petition is denied, the costs are charged to the party who incurs them,
unless the judge finds "manifest inappropriateness" in the petition, in which
case the judge may charge the costs to the petitioner or the injured individual
or both jointly, according to their conduct.219 The article 23 treatment of
costs is decidedly more lenient toward individuals who bring habeas corpus
petitions than was the old standard.22
The Habeas Corpus Act also addresses the overwhelming failure of the
Argentine security forces to cooperate with the process of habeas corpus during
the time of the dictatorship. Although the duty of the security forces to comply
with legitimate judicial orders from a constitutional court -- especially in
matters concerning constitutional rights -- is implicit in Argentine law,"1 the
experience with habeas corpus during the dictatorship made explicit recognition
of this fact necessary.
f. Appeal,
Articles 7, 10, 19 and 20 of the Habeas Corpus Act establish the right of
appeal from decisions at various stages of the habeas corpus process. These
include appeals for a denial in limine of a petition or a finding of incompetence
by the court of first instance (article 10),' appeals from a decision of a
judge of first instance (articles 19-20),' appeals to a federal court of appeals
(article 20), and appeals of extraordinary recourse (article 7).' Further-
more, the detainee is released if the government appeals (article 19).'
law is presumed to be constitutional until it is found to be otherwise. Given this assumption, an authority
is justified in relying on the law and should not be sanctioned if the law is later found to be unconstitutional.
See N. SAG(tS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 472.
219. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 23.
220. C6DIGO PROC. PENAL at art. 620. Article 620 of the Criminal Procedure Code provided simply
that the losing party always pays the entire cost of the habeas corpus process. The Code established a
complex system of sanctions for officials who did not cooperate with the process, did not comply with a
habeas corpus writ or sought to avoid a court order. The sanctions included fines, arrests, imprisonment,
and reports to the officials' superiors. Id. The Habeas Corpus Act simplified the sanctions provisions into
one article. At the same time, treatment of sanctions in the Act is much less specific or rigorous than the
former provisions. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 24.
221. N. SAO0US, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 489.
222. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 10.
223. Id. Article 19 provides for the "complaint" (queja) as a recourse to the federal courts of appeals
against a denial by the judge of first instance of a motion of appeal.
224. See generally N. SAGO S, RECURSO EXTRAORDNARIO (1984).
225. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 19.
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B. Judicial Control of Habeas Corpus Under Civilian Rule
1. Judicial Review of the Legitimacy of States of Siege
From the years 1984 to 1989, the constitutionally elected government of
Rafil Alfonsfn declared two separate states of siege of sixty and thirty days,
respectively.
a. The 1985 State of Siege
President Alfonsfn declared the first state of siege in response to civil
unrest prior to the November 1985 elections." These first term elections
were an important step for the Alfonsfn Administration. Since they were the
first consecutive democratic elections in ten years, the government was ex-
tremely concerned that they take place without incident. A series of bombing
attacks on both military installations and political organizations threatened to
disrupt the elections. 7
On October 21, 1985, the administration, based on evidence that the
bombings were the work of a paramilitary right-wing organization, issued
Decree No. 2049/85 that ordered the arrest of a group of individuals allegedly
responsible for the attacks. 8 The group consisted of both civilians and ac-
tive and retired members of the armed forces. Several of the members of the
armed forces detained under the executive order were indicted for human rights
violations committed during the time of the dictatorship. 9
226. AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 9, at 51.
227. Id.
228. Decree No. 2049/85, promulgated Oct. 21, 1985.
229. Decree 2049/85 ordered the arrest of General Carlos Guillermo Sufrez Mason, Colonel Pascual
Oscar Guerrieri, Colonel Alejandro Agustfn Arias Duval, Captain Osvaldo Rodolfo Antinori, Captain
Leopoldo Cao, Major Jorge Horacio Granada and others. Id. At the time of the decree, Sudrez Mason was
in hiding in the United States, having fled Argentina in 1984 after a federal judge issued a warrant for his
arrest in connection with human rights violations committed during the period 1976-80, while he was
Commander of the First Army Corps. AMERICAS WATCH REPORT, supra note 9, at 51-53. In 1986, Federal
Judge Luis Fernando Nifio ordered the prosecution of Suirez Mason and, in 1987, he was captured in the
United States and extradited to Argentina. Id. Sudrez Mason was held in preventive detention pending trial
of the commanders of the First Corps for human rights violations. Pdgina 12, July 4, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
Recently, however, President Carlos Menem pardoned Sudrez Mason, among others. See J. Timerman,
Fear Returns to Argentina, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1991, at 21, col. 1. At the time of the decree, Colonel
Pascual Oscar Guerrieri was also charged in connection with human rights violations that took place under
the jurisdiction of the Second Army Corps. Guerrieri eventually benefitted from the "due obedience" law
of June 4, 1987. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, CULPABLES PARA LA SOCIEDAD, IMPUNES
POR LA LEY 66 (1988) (on file with author).
Decree2049/85 also ordered the detention of civilians Ernesto Ratdl Luciano Rivanera Carlds, Enrique
Gilardi Novaro, Daniel Horacio Rodriguez, Jorge Antonio Vago, Alberto HernAn Camps, and Rosendo
Maria Fraga. Ernesto Rivanera Carls brought a habeas corpus petition that asserted that his arrest was
the result of misidentification. 1986-A L.L. 139. The executive acknowledged the mistake, released Ernesto
Ratdl Rivanera Carlds, and ordered the detention of Ratil J. Roberto Rivanera Carlds. Decree No. 2052/85,
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Decree No. 2049/85 placed the named individuals under a sixty day
executive detention not subject to judicial review. The executive stated that the
detention order, enacted by executive decree because Congress was in recess,
was based on the powers accorded to the executive by articles 23 and 86 of
the Argentine Constitution." Decree No. 2049/85 did not, however, declare
a state of siege. During the following days, a number of habeas corpus peti-
tions were submitted challenging the constitutionality of the detentions made
without a declaration of a state of siege. 31 Several federal judges found that
Decree No. 2049/85 was unconstitutional for that reason. 2
In response to those decisions and to increased social unrest, the executive
issued Decrees No. 2069/85 and 2070/85 on October 25, 1985, declaring a
state of siege of sixty days throughout the nation and reordering the detention
of the individuals named in Decree No. 2049/85.3 3 The executive made the
declaration under its article 86 powers in the absence of congressional approv-
al. Several more habeas corpus petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Decree No. 2070/85 were brought on behalf of the detained individuals. The
petitioners argued that the continued detention of the named individuals, after
the presumably unconstitutional arrest order of 2049/85, violated article
23.234
The Supreme Court granted an appeal of extraordinary recourse in the case
of Jorge Granada to clarify the Court's position on the examination of the
legitimacy and reasonableness of executive detentions during a state of
siege.25 A number of federal courts of first instance .and the Court of Ap-
peals of Buenos Aires had held that the state ofsiege declared by Decree No.
2069/85 was legitimately declared within the bounds established by the Consti-
tution. 6 The Court of Appeals based its decisions primarily on the fact that
promulgated Oct. 23, 1985.
230. Decree No. 2049, promulgated Oct. 23, 1985.
231. See Osvaldo Antinori, 1986-A L.L. 141 (1986); Jorge Vago, 1986-A L.L. 144 (1986); Radl
Rivanera Carls, 1986-A L.L. 147 (1986); Horacio Daniel Rodriguez, 1985-E L.L. 292 (1985); Pascual
Oscar Guerrieri, 1986-A L.L. 151 (1986).
232. The judge of first instance in Antinori found Decree 2049/85 unconstitutional and ordered
Antinori's release. 1986-A L.L. at 142. In both Rodriguez, 1985-E L.L. at 306-07, and Guerrieri, 1986-A
L.L. at 151-52, the Court of Appeals of Buenos Aires also found Decree 2049/85 unconstitutional. Relying
on article 6 (the unconstitutionality provision) of the Habeas Corpus Act, the Court found that article 23
powers could not be exercised without the declaration of a state of siege, and ordered the release of
Rodriguez and Guerrieri.
233. Decree No. 2069/85, promulgated Oct. 25, 1985, reprinted in XLV-D A.D.L.A. 3722 (1985);
Decree No. 2070/85, promulgated Oct. 25, 1985, reprinted in XLV-D A.D.L.A. 3723 (1985).
234. See Horacio Daniel Rodriquez, 307 Fallos 2330 (1985); Jorge Granada, 307 Fallos 2317 (1985);
Osvaldo Antinori, 1986-A L.L 142; Alejandro Arias Duval, 1986-A L.L. 145 (1985); Rosendo Fraga,
1986-A L.L. 152 (1986).
235. 307 Fallos 2284, 2305-06 (1985).
236. See 307 Fallos at 2330; 307 Fallos at 2317 (Supreme Court cases citing federal court of first
instance); see also Antinoi, 1986-A L.L at 142; Duval, 1986-A L.L. at 145; Fraga, 1986-A L.L. at 152.
41
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President Alfonsfn acted within his powers as established by article 23 and
article 86, clause 19."
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the legislators, by adopting the
control of legitimacy provision of article 4, clause 1 intended to adhere to past
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the limitations on judicial control over
the declaration of a state of siege."8 The Granada Court expressly found
that the Habeas Corpus Act grants the judiciary the power to examine four
elements of a state of siege, namely: 1) the competency of the organ that pro-
nounced the state of siege (e.g., the president when Congress is in recess or
the president with the Senate's approval in case of foreign attack); 2) the form
of the legislation or decree that established the state of siege (e.g., technical
requirements that laws be in written form and transmitted to the proper minis-
ter); 3) the establishment of an express period for the state of siege; and 4) the
establishment of a territorial limitation for the state of siege. 9 After the
resolution of these issues, the Alfonsin government lifted the state of siege and
released those detainees not indicted on criminal charges.240
The justification for the last two reviewable elements was not clear. The
Court may have intended to limit review to verifying whether the state of siege
declaration contained temporal and territorial limitations.24 Or, as Sagil6s
maintains, the Court may have intended to permit a judge to review whether
these temporal and territorial limitations were themselves reasonable under the
circumstances. 242 The Granada decision established, however, that the judi-
ciary cannot rely on article 4, clause 1 to evaluate whether there in fact exists
an interior commotion or exterior attack to justify the declaration of a state of
siege.'
b. The 1989 State of Siege
In February, 1989, the Argentine economy began a rapid decline. High
interest rates, an extremely weak national currency and hyperinflation devastat-
ed the standard of living and contributed to political instability. 2' In May,
237. See, e.g., Antinori, 1986-A L.L. at 142-43; Fraga, 1986-A L.L. at 153.
238. 307 Fallos at 2304, 2318 (procedural history contained in dissent of Belluscio, J.).
239. Id. at 2304. For a discussion of the Granada holding regarding the legitimacy ofa state of siege,
see Bidart Campos, Lo viejo y lo nuevo en lajurisprudencia actual de la corte sobre el estado de sitlo,
116 E.D. 335, 335-36 (1986); Padilla, Estado de sitioy control de razonabilidad, 1986-B L.L. 214,214-16
(1986).
240. Decree No. 2337/85, promulgated Dec. 7, 1985, reprinted in XLVI-A A.D.L.A. 7 (1985).
241. 307 Fallos at 2307.
242. N. SAG0Ps, HABEAS copus, supra note 8, at 255.
243. Id. at 265.
244. For a description of the social and economic conditions leading to the unrest that preceded the
1989 state of siege, see Pdgina 12, June 4, 1989, at 6-20 (special supplement); Derechos Humanos, June,
1989, at 6-10.
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1989, Argentina held its first presidential election in sixty-three years to
replace a constitutionally elected government, electing the Peronist candidate
Carlos Menem. The election did little to resolve the insecurity caused by the
severe economic crisis. The resulting social unrest culminated in a series of
attacks on supermarkets in the cities of Rosario and C6rdoba.24 The attacks
were accompanied by violent clashes between looters and police forces and
threatened to spread throughout the country. During the last days of May and
the first week of June there were over 300 separate incidents of looting, which
involved over 40,000 people.246 The government alleged that the lootings
were provoked by members of left-wing organizations .247
In response, on May 29, 1989, President Alfonsfn declared a national state
of siege for a period of thirty days.248 After the declaration of the state of
siege, lootings continued to spread to areas of greater Buenos Aires, Mendoza
and TucumAn.249 Fifteen people died, at least a hundred were wounded and
approximately two thousand were detained on criminal charges ." In addition
to those arrested and charged with criminal offenses, over fifty individuals
were detained for political reasons by the executive, using its article 23
powers.25' Several detainees brought habeas corpus petitions, challenging the
constitutionality of the detentions and the rational relation between the arrests
and the declared causes of the state of siege. 1
2
As Congress was in session, the executive submitted legislation to imple-
ment the state of siege. 53 Before Congress could consider it, however, the
245. Pdgina 12, May 30, 1989, at 1-3.
246. Buenos Aires Herald, June 1, 1989, at 1; Buenos Aires Herald, June 2, 1989 at 1; Pdgina 12,
June 2, 1989, at 2, 6.
247. Argentine Minister of Interior Carlos Pugliese and other government officials maintained
throughout the state of siege that the lootings were the work of left-wing agitators. Pdgina 12, June 1, 1989,
at4; Pdgina 12, June 8, 1989, at7; Buenos Aires Herald, June 1, 1989, at 1, 11; La Naci6n, June 8, 1989,
at 10. Left-wing political parties protested that their members were engaged only in legitimate forms of
political activities and accused the executive and the courts of engaging in a witch hunt. Pggina 12, June
1, 1989, at 8-9; El Sur, June 6, 1989, at 3. A commission made up of government officials and federal
judges investigating crimes in connection with the lootings announced that five percent of the lootings could
be attributed to the actions of left-wing activists. PAgina 12, June 8, 1989, at 4.
248. Decree No. 714/89, promulgated May 29, 1989, reprinted in 1989 Boletfn Oficial 26.645
[hereinafter B.O.]. See also Pdgina 12, May 30, 1989, at 3-4.
249. For accounts of the social unrest after the declaration of the state of siege, see La Naci6n, May
31, 1989, at 1, 10-11; La Naci6n, June 2, 1989, at 8; La Naci6n, June 3, 1989, at 8; Pdgina 12, May 30,
1989, at 2-3; Pdgina 12, May 31, 1989, at 2-3.
250. Buenos Aires Herald, June 1, 1989, at 1; Buenos Aires Herald, June 2, 1989, at 1; Pdgina 12,
June 2, 1989, at 2, 6; Pdgina 12, June 4, 1989, at 7.
251. For a detailed description of these executive detentions, see author's memoranda of June 5, 8
& 16, 1989 to the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee (on file with author).
252. See infra Section III.B.2.b. for a discussion of these petitions.
253. Pdgina 12, May 30, 1989, at 3-4.
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executive issued decrees banning public political meetings 4 and ordered the
arrest and detention of several individuals accused of organizing lootings. 5
These orders included the arrest and detention of C6sar Christian Barrionuevo
and Roberto Daniel Medina, two directors of the Communist Youth Federa-
tion. 6 On June 1, Congress passed the legislation and approved the state
of siege.
In considering Barrionuevo and Medina's habeas corpus petitions, the court
had to determine the legitimacy of the state of siege under article 4, clause 1
of the Habeas Corpus Act.57 The pair had been arrested and charged with
"endangering public tranquility" under the executive's article 23 powers."5
The judge found Barrionuevo and Medina's detention to be unconstitutional
and ordered their release. He held that the state of siege declaration was
unconstitutional because President Alfonsfn had declared the state of siege
while Congress was in session, in violation of article 67, clause 26 of the
Constitution. 59 The judge further determined that the executive decrees
issued before the June 1 congressional approval of the state of siege (e.g., the
suspension of the right of association and the ordering of executive detentions)
were also unconstitutional because Congress could not rectify the unconstitu-
tionality of executive decrees by approving a state of siege declaration at a
later date.260 Finally, the judge found that the executive had to publish Law
23.662 (the act declaring the state of siege) in the Bolettn Oficial before
applying powers taken under the declaration to individuals.261
The Court of Appeals of Buenos Aires overturned the lower court's
decision, holding that the events in Rosario and other parts of the country
constituted a "state of emergency. "262 The Court reasoned that in a state of
emergency the executive may act as if Congress is in recess and declare a state
254. Decree No. 743/89, promulgated May 31, 1989, reprinted in 1989 B.O. 26.645, supra note 248,
at 2; Decree No. 745/89 promulgated May 31, 1989, reprinted in 1989 B.O. 26.646, supra note 248, at
3.
255. Decree Nos. 730/89, 744/89, 746/89, & 747/89, promulgated May 31, 1989, reprinted in 1989
B.O. 26.647, supra note 248, at 2-3.
256. DecreeNo. 746/89, promulgated May 31, 1989, reprinted in 1989 B.O. 26.647, supra note 248,
at 2.257. Decision of Judge Victor Pettigiani, Cdmara de Instrucci6n Criminal del Corte de Buenos Aires,
June 1, 1989 (unpublished decision on file with author) [hereinafter Pettigiani Decision]. For press reports
on the Pettigiani Decision, see Buenos Aires Herald, June 3, 1989, at 1; El Sur, June 3, 1989, at 2.
258. Pettigiani Decision, supra note 257, at 2, 8, 15. The two federal police officers that arrested
Barrionuevo and Medina testified that neither individual was involved in acts of looting, pillaging or other
criminal acts. Id. at 8.
259. Id. at 16.
260. Id. at 10-12.
261. Id. at 13.
262. Decision of Judges Liliana Catucci, Radl Maduefio and Adolfo Cavete, Cmara Nacional de
Apelaciones en lo Criminal, Sala V, Buenos Aires, June 4, 1989, at 9-10 (unpublished decision on file
with author) [hereinafter Barrionuevo Appeal]. For press reports of the Court of Appeals' decision, see
Buenos Aires Herald, June 5, 1989, at 1; PNgina 12, June 8, 1989, at 4.
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of siege because Congress retains its power to approve or suspend the declara-
tion.263 The Court held that subsequent approval by Congress corrected any
constitutional deficiencies that might have accompanied the declaration of the
state of siege. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that the widespread press
coverage that accompanied congressional approval of the state of siege amply
fulfilled the publication requirements of Argentine law.2'
On June 12, 1989, the Supreme Court rejected a petition of avocamiento
(action to seek removal to a superior court) brought by the.appellants, holding
that the appeal must proceed through the recourse of extraordinary appeal.26
On June 20, 1989, before the Supreme Court had an ,opportunity to consider
the extraordinary appeal, the executive ordered Barrionuevo and Medina
released.266 The important issues raised by the decision of the Court of
Appeals regarding the relevant powers of the executive and Congress in
declaring a state of siege went unresolved.
2. Application of the Standard of Reasonableness
As noted above, the reasonableness standard adopted by article 4, clause
2 of the Habeas Corpus Act did not resolve the question of the degree of proof
needed to be offered by the executive to establish a rational relationship
between any given arrest and the justification of the state of siege declara-
tion.267 Nor does the Act articulate the extent to which the judiciary must
accept the reasons offered by the executive for detentions, or what type of
investigation or hearing of proof must be conducted by the judge of first
instance. The cases that have been decided pursuant to article 4, clause 2 are
contradictory and have done little to clarify these important issues.
a. The 1985 State of Siege
Following the second decree declaring the 1985 state of siege, several
federal courts of first instance used article 4, clause 2 of the Habeas Corpus
Act to invalidate the executive detentions of several individuals.26 The Fed-
263. Id. at 9.
264. Id. at 13-14.
265. See Buenos Aires Herald, June 13, 1989, at 11; La Naci6n, June 7, 1989, at 8; La Naci6n, June
13, 1989, at 8.,
266. See El Sur, June 21, 1986, at 6; La Naci6n, June 21, 1989, at 10; PAgina 12, June 23, 1989,
at 6.
267. The review of reasonableness adopted by clause 2 does not resolve the conflict between Supreme
Court cases such as Zamorano, 71merman and Moya and cases such as 7Tzio and Perelmuter. See supra
note 189 and accompanying text.
268. SeeHoracioDaniel Rodriguez, 307 Fallos 2284, 2330 (1985); Jorge Granada, 307 Fallos at2304;
Osvaldo Antinori, 1986-A L.L. 142 (1986); Alejandro Arias Duval, 1986-A L.L. 145 (1986); Rosendo
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eral Court of Appeals of Buenos Aires overturned these decisions based on the
information provided by the executive in the original state of siege decree. 69
The executive stated in an earlier state of siege decree that the attacks that gave
rise to the emergency were the work of "a group of persons acting in coordina-
tion within and without the country to fulfill a common purpose of violence
against democratic institutions and the people.""27 The Court of Appeals
found this sufficient justification under the standard of reasonableness.27
In the case of Jorge Granada, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
the reasonable relationship between executive detentions and causes of states
of siege.27 The Supreme Court found that article 4, clause 2 of the Habeas
Corpus Act adopted the Primera Plana two-part "control of reasonableness"
test.2' Adopting the standard set forth in Tizio and Perelmuter rather than
the standard established by the decisions of Zamorano, Timerman, Moya and
Yrigoyen, the Court added that "the Executive does [not] need to judicially
prove the bases of the decision that motivated the arrest. "274 The Court held
that the executive's original state of siege decree unequivocally expressed the
relationship between the state of siege and the arrest of Granada.2 75
The Supreme Court also established that the intended length of the state
of siege is an important element for the judiciary to consider when examining
the reasonableness of the decision to detain an individual. The Court held that
for a detention to be reasonable, the state of siege must be brief.2 76 The
indefinite extension of a state of siege, the Court stated, violates the Constitu-
tion that the state of siege is meant to defend. The Court's reasoning thus
allows the executive to detain individuals without offering proof of any connec-
tion to the cause of the state of siege, so long as the period of the state of siege
is "brief. "277
Justice Belluscio dissented on the point of the judicial "control of rea-
sonableness" of detentions during a state of siege.27 His dissenting opinion
Fraga, 1986-A L.L. 152 (1986).
269. See, e.g., Antinori, 1986-A L.L. at 143-44.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 307 Fallos 2317 (1985). For a discussion of the Granada decision and the control of reasonable-
ness, see Bidart Campos, supra note 239, at 337-38; Morello & Loft, El estado de sitio en el estado de
derecho, 1985-IV J.A. 618, 623 (1985).
273. 307 Fallos at 2308.
274. Id. at 2311. See also Bidart Campos, supra note 239, at 337-38.
275. 307 Fallos at 2310..
276. Id. at 2309.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2318-19 (Belluscio, J. dissenting). For a discussion of the Belluscio dissent, see Bidart
Campos, supra note 239, at 341; Morello & Loft, supra note 272, at 623. Bidart Campos notes that the
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argued that in addition to the Primera Plana standard adopted by the majority,
the cases of Zamorano, 7imermnan, Moya and Yrigoyen indicate that article 4,
clause 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act should also include the observation of the
following standards:
[A] duty of the executive to provide the judges of each case sufficient information
concerning the causes that give rise to the detention in question; [and] ... a consid-
eration by the court of the factual and judicial situation at the time of the resolution
of the petition.279
Belluscio noted that the judge of first instance in the Granada petition had
requested more information from the Ministry of Defense. The Minister of
Defense had replied that the executive could not be compelled to provide
information that was at the time classified. The Minister instead relied on the
statements of the original state of siege decree. Justice Belluscio concluded that
under these circumstances the executive had not complied with its duty to
provide information, and it was impossible for the judiciary to exercise the
control of reasonability.2 °
b. The 1989 State of Siege
In the Barrionuevo/Medina petition during the 1989 state of siege, the judge
of first instance found that the detentions of Barrionuevo and Medina were not
rationally related to the causes of the state of siege.211 The two communist
leaders had been ringing doorbells and stopping individuals to hand out pam-
phlets encouraging residents of the neighborhood of Soldati, in greater Buenos
Aires, to attend a march and cacerolazo (banging of pots and pans) to protest
hunger among the city's poor. The judge found that when the detainees were
stopped for questioning they freely exhibited their national identity cards and
were not at that time actively taking part in or encouraging acts of pillage,
looting or other criminal acts. Given that the executive had stated that acts of
looting were the cause of the state of siege, the judge observed no rational
relation between Barrionuevo and Medina's actions and the causes that gave
rise to the state of siege.28 2
The Court of Appeals overturned the judge of first instance, ignoring the
article 4, clause 2 reasonableness standard discussed by both the majority and
the dissent in the Granada case.283 The court instead reverted to the standard
established in the 1959 Sofia case, which held that the executive's decision to
279. 307 Fallos at 2318-19.
280. Id. at 2319-20.
281. Pettigiani Decision, supra note 257, at 13-15.
282. Id. at 15.
283. Barrionuevo Appeal, supra note 262, at 16-19.
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detain an individual during a state of siege should not be overturned unless
"clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, persecutory or discriminatory." 284
Under the "clearly unreasonable" test, the Court of Appeals found that
Barrionuevo and Medina were "surprised in the act of agitation without being
able to explain their presence." 285 The Court concluded that such behavior
had the potential of creating a grave conflict and that therefore the detention
of the petitioners was not clearly unreasonable. The Court further reasoned
that the thirty day limit to the state of siege added to the reasonableness of the
executive detentions. Barrionuevo and Medina were released before the
Supreme Court could hear their appeal of extraordinary recourse and consider
the issue of the proper standard of review for the article 4, clause 2 reason-
ableness standard.286
Two other federal courts considered the relation between executive
detentions of individuals and the causes of the 1989 state of siege. A judge of
the federal court of Buenos Aires rejected a habeas corpus petition on behalf
of a member of the Liberation Party who had been detained for distributing
pamphlets urging people to "take to the streets and fight." The judge found
that a correlation existed between the acts of the detainee and the causes of the
state of siege. The judge inferred, without examination, that the claims of the
executive concerning the basis of the arrest were correct. 8 7
Finally a federal judge in San Miguel de Tucumin granted the habeas
corpus petition of two communist party activists who had been detained for
"inciting the formation of a demonstration."288 The judge noted that the de-
tention was based on a request from the Governor of Tucumdn, stating that
the two activists had been "surprised while inciting a group of persons to
assault a supermarket."289 The judge found that the Governor's request was
284. Id. at 17. The application of three different tests for the reasonableness standard contained in
article 4, clause 2 is another example of the difficulties caused by the lack of stare decisis in the develop-
ment ofjudicial standards. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
285. Barrionuevo Appeal, supra note 262, at 10-11, 17-18.
286. See El Sur, June 21, 1986, at 6; La Naci6n, June 21, 1989, at 10; Pdgina 12, June 23, 1989,
at 6.
287. La Naci6n, June 7, 1989, at 8. Judge Remfgio GonzAlez Moreno, CAmara de lnstrucci6n en lo
Criminal No. 18, Buenos Aires, rejected the habeas corpus petition submitted on behalf of Carlos Malvicino,
who was detained pursuant to Decree No. 744/89, promulgated May 31, 1989. Malvicino was released
on June 20. See El Sur, June 21, 1989, at 6; La Naci6n, June 21, 1989, at 10; Psgina 12, June 23, 1989,
at 6.
288. Decision of Judge Ricardo Sanjuan, Corte Federal en lo Criminal No. 2, San Miguel de
TucumAn, June 9, 1989 (unpublished decision of habeas corpus on file with author) [hereinafter Lanoel
Decision]; see also La Naci6n, June 12, 1989, at 15. Judge Sanjuan granted the habeas corpus petitions
submitted on behalf of Guy Mauricio Lanoel and Eduardo Gustavo Sosa, who had been detained pursuant
to Decree No. 785/89, promulgated June 6, 1989, reprinted in 1989 B.O. 26.650, supra note 248, at 1.
289. Lanoel Decision, supra note 288, at 2. Lanoel and Sosa were arrested at four in the morning,
50 meters from Lanoel's residence and eight blocks from Tucumin's commercial district. The judge found
that these facts, and the lack of credible testimony from the arresting officers, indicated that the petitioners
were not involved in inciting lootings. Id. at 6-7.
Vol. 16:1, 1991
.Habeas Corpus Law in Argentina
"not only absurd and unbelievable, but a naked intentional political twist.""29
The Court went on to find that the executive had not in any way established
a connection between the activists' detention and the causes of the state of
siege. The judge adhered to the dissent of Justice Belluscio in Granada and
held that the executive must always provide unequivocal and precise informa-
tion concerning the cause of the detention, even during a state of siege.29'
3. Judicial Control of Executive Detentions
a. Detentions Without Declarations
Despite prior judicial holdings the Alfonsfn government attempted to
exercise its article 23 powers of detention without actually declaring a state
of siege.292 The executive argued that the detentions were necessary to pro-
tect the democratic form of government established by the Constitution. The
executive also claimed that the detentions could be ordered as a necessary
action in a true state of emergency.293
One federal court upheld the detentions based on the assumption that the
executive had implicitly declared a state of siege.294 The assumption of an
implicit state of siege is questionable given the circumstances. The executive
first expressly declared that it did not wish to declare a state of siege, then
declared a state of siege three days after making the detentions. Thus, at the
time of the detentions, no state of siege-had been declared:295
Other federal courts refused to allow the executive to order detentions
without the prior declaration of a state of siege. One court of appeals used the
290. Id.
291. Id. at 8.
292. In addition to the powers the Argentine Constitution grants to the executive in article 23 and
article 86, clause 19 the government argued that it had the power to order the executive detention of the
named individuals pursuant to articles 1 and 33 (establishing a republican form of government), article 22
(defining crime of sedition), and article 86, clauses I and 15 (naming executive as supreme general
administrator and commander-in-chief); Criminal Procedure Code, article 4 (authorizing arrests for crimes
discovered flagrante delicto); Law 23.077, article 15 (authorizing actions in defense of republican-
democratic form of government); and the Code of Military Justice. For a discussion of the authorities cited
by the executive in Decree No. 2049/85, see N. SAGO"dS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 269.
293. Various Argentine constitutions have provided for a "state of emergency" in addition to a state
of siege. The original text of the Constitution of 1853, article 83, clause 20 provided for a state of
emergency that would lapse in 10 days if not approved by -Congress. During this time, the executive could
detain individuals who would regain their liberty if a state of siege was not called. This provision was
removed by the reform of 1860. The Constitution of 1949 provided for a state of prevention and alarm
during which time individuals could be detained for 30 days without the declaration of a state of siege.
For a discussion of the state of emergency problem, see REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL I, supra note 20, at
295-301, 305-06; N. SAGDtS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 276-77, 282-83; Morello & Lofi, supra
note 272, at 623-25.
294. Horacio Daniel Rodriguez, 1985-E L.L. 292, 299 (1985) (reporter commentary).
295. N. SAG0tS, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 271-72.
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article 6 power of the Habeas Corpus Act to declare Decree 2049/85, the first
1985 state of siege declaration, unconstitutional.29 6 The courts reasoned that
if the executive were allowed to order detentions without declaring a state of
siege, the result would be to grant the executive expansive powers without the
important safeguards provided in article 23 of the Constitution. The exercise
of such powers by the executive, the courts held, goes beyond the scope of
the Constitution.297
b. Extrajudicial Detentions
During the 1989 state of siege, the executive and the judicial branches
came into conflict regarding state of siege detentions. President Alfonsfn
declared a state of siege and ordered the detention of several individuals before
Congress, which was in session, could consider the measures. As described
above, a federal judge of first instance ordered the release of two of the
detainees based on the lack of any reasonable relation between the detentions
and any possible state of siege."'
The executive nonetheless continued to maintain that the declaration was
constitutional. The Ministry of Interior appealed the habeas corpus decision,
and the executive ordered the redetention of the released petitioners.299 The
redetention of the petitioners for the same reasons that they were originally
detained conflicted directly with article 19 of the Habeas Corpus Act. Further-
more, by ordering redetention on the same grounds, the executive directly
opposed an order of a federal court, which had already held those grounds to
be not reasonably related to the state of siege.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the judge of
first instance on the constitutionality of the executive detention. The Court
nonetheless questioned the propriety of the executive ordering the redetention
of the individuals freed by the habeas corpus petition while the appeal was
pending."° The Court of Appeals noted that article 19 of the Habeas Corpus
Act provides that individuals freed by a habeas corpus decision remain free
during the course of an appeal. The Court held that the "new detention orders
signify a rebellion toward the judicial power which should be addressed by the
Supreme Court as the head of the judicial power to resolve as it sees fit. 01
296. 1985-E L.L. at 306 (reporter commentary); see also Pascual Oscar Guerrieri, 1986-A L.L. 151
(1985) (reporter commentary).
297. 1985-E L.L. at 302-04 (1985).
298. See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
299. See Buenos Aires Herald, June 3, 1989, at 1; El Sur, June 3, 1989, at 2; La Naci6n, June 3,
1989, at 8; P~gina 12, June 3, 1989, at 3.
300. Barrionuevo Appeal, supra note 262, at 19.
301. Id. at 20.
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Before the Supreme Court had the opportunity to hear the appeal of extraordi-
nary recourse brought by the detained individuals, the executive released the
detainees, thus averting a potential conflict with the Supreme Court.
4. Treatment of Petitions on Behalf of the Disappeared
a. Petitions for Past Disappearances
Following the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act in 1984, a number of
habeas corpus petitions were brought on behalf of persons who had disappeared
during the years of military dictatorship. Not surprisingly, the filing of these
petitions did not result in the discovery of any new information concerning the
disappeared. Nonetheless, the courts hearing these petitions recognized that
the Act incorporated the duty to investigate, established by Supreme Court
rulings during the dictatorship.3"2
In the case of Beatriz, Arango y Otros, the Federal Court of Buenos Aires
heard a habeas corpus petition brought on behalf of a number of individuals
who had disappeared during the dictatorship.3"u The judge of first instance
emphasized that he was entertaining the petition in accordance with the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence during the time of the dictatorship. The judge
articulated the judiciary's duty to investigate and pursue information when
considering petitions presented on behalf of individuals whose whereabouts
were uncertain. According to the judge, this duty involves a thorough investi-
gation, including the contacting of the Interior and Defense ministers, the
armed forces' chiefs, the security forces, the federal police, the Director of
the Federal Penitentiary Service, the CONADEP Commission and the Presi-
dent."' The judge in Beatriz, Arango y Otros held that neither his inves-
tigation nor that of the CONADEP Commission found that the beneficiaries
of the petition were detained illicitly anywhere in the country. Therefore, the
federal judge ruled that the petition failed to address one of the requirements
of the Habeas Corpus Act, mandating use of the habeas corpus process only
when public authorities illegally threaten or detain individuals. The judge then
dismissed the petition and forwarded all the information he had obtained to the
302. Immediately after the democratically elected Alfonsfn government came to power, the Supreme
Court decided appeals of two habeas corpus petitions submitted on behalf of persons detained during the
military dictatorship. Edmundo Daniel Zsapiro, 306 Fallos 448 (1984) and Ricardo Ren6 Haider, 306 Fallos
551 (1984). The Supreme Court cited Pdrez de Smith, 297 Fallos 338 (1977), and In6s Ollero, 300 Fallos
457 (1978), to find a judicial duty to provide a reasonable investigation into the whereabouts of missing
persons. The Court, however, found that the individuals were not being detained by public authorities and
therefore dismissed the petitions.
303. Beatriz, Arango y Otros, decided Jan. 11, 1985, by the Federal Court of Buenos Aires, reprinted
in P. BIsSERIER & F. TAL6N, supra note 8, at 79.
304. Id. at 80-81.
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public prosecutor to investigate possible crimes. The Court's decision was
upheld by the Court of Appeals for Buenos Aires.305
The Supreme Court, in Laura Noemi Creature, similarly affirmed the
Habeas Corpus Act's incorporation of the judicially created duty to investi-
gate." 6 The Court expressly recognized the gravity and uncertainty surround-
ing the plight of the disappeared and reiterated that it was the duty of the
courts to fully investigate all habeas corpus petitions.30 7 However, the Court
found that all illegal detentions had ceased when the constitutional government
came to power on December 10, 198 3."' The Court reasoned that the pur-
pose of habeas corpus petitions was to locate individuals possibly detained by
public authorities. The Court concluded that the evidence offered by the
petitioner to establish the criminal activity of those who had detained the
disappeared was inappropriate for a habeas corpus petition and should have
been directed to judges who were investigating and trying such criminal
cases.
309
b. The Attack on La Tablada
After passage of the Habeas Corpus Act, no substantial accusations of
disappearances carried out by either the government security forces or paramil-
itary terrorist groups were raised.310 However, the question of terrorism and
the role of the armed forces in combatting terrorism resurfaced after the 1989
armed attack on the army regiment, La Tablada, by members of a leftist
organization. 1
305. Id.
306. Laura Noemf Creature, 307 Fallos 93 (1984) (summary), reprinted in P. BISSERIER & F. TAL6N,
supra note 8, at 86 (complete decision). In Creature, a federal judge in Buenos Aires heard a habeas corpus
petition on behalf of a person detained by the military government in March 1976. After conducting an
investigation the judge determined that Creature was not held anywhere in the country. The petitioners
sought to enter into evidence past petitions and negative replies from the security forces on behalf of
Creature. The court did not admit this evidence and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals upheld
the decision. Id. at 89.
307. Id. at 89-90. The Supreme Court referred to and incorporated the opinion of the Solicitor
General, in which he cited the standard created by the Perez de Smith, Ollero and Giorgi decisions. Id.
at 87-89, 92. For a discussion of these decisions, see supra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
308. Id. at 91-92. The Solicitor General noted the government's actions upon coming to power of
dismantling the detention centers and inveitigating the disappearances. Id. at 88.
309. Id. at 91.
310. While the number of disappearances dropped sharply after 1982, NUNcA MAS, supra note 1, at
298, deaths due to political violence have continued. The Center for Studies for the New Majority reported
that during the period from September 1, 1985 to February 1, 1989, 297 deaths were due to political
violence. La Naci6n, Feb. 20, 1989, at 4.
311. On the morning of January 23, 1989, a group of approximately 50 armed persons, members of
the All for the Fatherland Movement (Movimiento Todos por la Patria (MTP)), carried out an attack on
La Tablada, capturing the barracks of the motorized infantry regiment. Members of the regiment and other
armed forces quickly resisted the attack and surrounded the barracks. President Alfonsfn ordered the army
to recapture the barracks. Fighting lasted for two and a half days and left 15 members of the armed forces
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Following the attack, serious accusations were made that members of the
armed forces had committed basic human rights violations during and immedi-
ately after the fighting at La Tablada.3 2 The most serious allegations con-
cerned attackers who were allegedly wounded, taken as prisoners, and later
executed. Additionally, some of those who allegedly participated in the attack
did not appear among those listed as dead or detained.
- In response, a group of human rights attorneys submitted a habeas corpus
petition on behalf of Carlos Jose Samojedny, one of the persons said to have
disappeared in the course of the attack.313 The petition sought to determine
if Samojedny had been detained by the security forces and, if not, whether an
order was pending for his arrest. The Samojedny petition was submitted to
Federal Judge Gerardo Larrambebere, who had been placed in charge of
processing those individuals detained in the course of the attack. After making
inquiries to the armed forces, the judge rejected the petition, finding that the
armed forces had neither detained Samojedny nor ordered his arrest.
5. The Problem of Judicial Detentions
Article 18 of the Argentine Constitution and the Habeas Corpus Act
establish that habeas corpus can be used to challenge detentions made without
a written order by a proper authority. Authorities competent to issue orders
of detention are primarily judicial, but also include, under the appropriate
circumstances, the executive power (state of siege), the houses of congress (for
noncriminal matters), and the police (in situations offlagrante delicto). The
procedure established by the Act cannot be used to challenge judicially ordered
and 28 attackers dead, with 18 attackers taken prisoner. The attack was condemned by political parties and
organizations across the political spectrum as a violent attack on the constitutional order. For a discussion
of the attack on LaTablada, see El Periodista, Jan. 27, 1989, at 1-12; PAgina 12, Feb. 20, 1989, at 12-13.
312. See Press Release of the Liga Argentina de Derechos Humanos (Argentine League for Human
Rights), Feb. 16, 1989 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Liga Argentina Press Release]; Press Release
of the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, Feb. 16, 1989 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Madres Press
Release]. Accusations included beatings, cigarette bums, the forced wearing of hoods during the military
interrogations, and the possible execution of wounded prisoners. Nonetheless, human rights organizations
found that after the intervention of a federal judge, the basic guarantees of the rule of law worked
reasonably well. La Naci6n, Feb. 28, 1989, at2 (reporting that the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights
had expressed satisfaction at the processing of the detainees).
313. Salinas Interviews, supra note 17. The petition alleged that at the time of the surrender, MTP
members Berta Calvo, Francisco Provenzano and Carlos Jose Samojedny were seen wounded but alive.
Calvo and Provenzano later appeared among those listed as killed during the attack, but Samojedny did
not appear on either the list of those killed or detained. Provenzano reportedly was slightly wounded in
one arm, but was well enough to carry Calvo, who was allegedly bleeding from the head and had been
severely wounded in the stomach. Samojedny was reportedly injured in the neck. After the surrender, the
captured attackers were hooded and told to give their names. The names of Provenzano, Calvo and
Samojedny were heard by other detainees. The three were then reportedly separated from the others and
taken away. Salinas Interviews, supra note 17; see also Liga Argentina Press Release, supra note 312;
Madres Press Release, supra note 312.
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detentions.314 Instead, the regular judicial appeals process is meant to protect
individuals from arbitrary action by the judiciary.315
Nonetheless, certain provisions of the Argentine Criminal Code enacted
by past military governments empower judges to order detentions for extended
periods of time on largely ideological grounds. For example, article 213 bis
of the Argentine Criminal Code provides that:
Any person who organizes or takes part inpermanent or transitory groupings which,
without being covered by article 210 of this code [illicit association], have as their
principal or secondary object the imposition of their ideas either by force or by fear
shall, from the sole fact of being members of such an organization, be restrained
by preventative isolation or detention for a period of three to eight years.3t 6
The article, which acts in addition to the regular conspiracy provision of the
Criminal Code, targets group activity included in the broadly defined area of
"imposing ideas by force or fear." There need not be a finding of criminal
action or criminal intent in connection with the group activity; any person may
be detained solely because of his or her membership in a particular organiza-
tion.
Under article 213 bis, judges may order persons charged to be detained
until trial. The pretrial period of investigation in Argentina is normally at least
six months. During this period the judicially ordered arrest and detention may
not be challenged by habeas corpus, amparo or any of the other extraordinary
recourses available under Argentine law. Habeas corpus does not apply
because the order of detention presumably emanates from a competent authori-
ty. Amparo is generally a recourse against unconstitutional administrative
actions and, as such, is also not applicable to judicially ordered detentions.
Finally, a detainee may not bring an appeal of extraordinary recourse until
there is a definitive sentence. Until tried and sentenced, persons arrested under
article 213 bis of the Criminal Code may be detained without the opportunity
to challenge the constitutionality of their detention.
314. N. SAG0ts, HABEAS coRpus, supra note 8, at 166-67.
315. Article 213 bis of the Argentine Criminal Code was originally enacted by Law 16.648, reprinted
in XXIV-C A.D.L.A. 2080 (1964). See C. RUBIANEs, EL c6DIO ,PENAL Y SU INTERPRETAcI6N JURIS-
PRUDENCEAL 220 (1980). The original version called for detentions from eight months to three years and
was drawn much more narrowly. Id. The article was revised a number of times during the 1970s by Law
18.953, promulgated Mar. 17, 1971, reprintedin XXXI-A A.D.L.A. 111 (1971); Law 20.509, promulgated
May 27, 1973, reprinted in XXXIII-C A.D.L.A. 2952 (1973); and Law 20.642, promulgated Jan. 11,
1974, reprinted in XXXIV-A A.D.L.A. 138 (1974). See also 0. BREGLTA ARIAS, CMDIGo PENAL Y LEYES
COMPLEMENTARIOS 770-72 (1985). On August 9, 1984, the constitutionally elected Congress passed Law
23.077, the "Law in Defense of the Democracy," reprinted in XLIV-C A.D.L.A. 3677 (1984). In the
presidential message introducing the legislation, the executive claimed that Law 23.077 made no changes
in article 213 bis of the criminal code, leaving the article as originally introduced by Law 16.648 in 1964.
However, by letting article 213 bis stand, Law 23.077 actually kept in place the restrictive version of Law
20.642. 0. BREGLIA ARiAS, supra, at 771.
316. C6DIO PROC. PENAL at art. 213 bis.
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During the June 1989 state of siege, Federal Judge Gerardo Larrambebere,
pursuant to article 213 bis, ordered the arrest and detention of the leadership
of the Argentine Workers Party (Partido Obrero (P0)), in connection with
widespread lootings of supermarkets. The judge also ordered the search,
seizure and closure of all the party's offices and printing presses. The judge
based his detention order on pamphlets that members of the organization had
distributed at the time of the lootings and an edition of the party newspaper
published a few days prior to the lootings. 317 The pamphlets and the newspa-
per urged people to congregate in the Plaza de Mayo to protest the state of
siege and called for the nation's unions to convene a general strike and demand
higher wages. Neither the pamphlet nor the newspaper called for lootings or
any other criminal activities.318
The judge ordered the PO leaders to be held in preventive detention for
five days, during which time they were questioned in camera concerning the
actions of the PO. On June 6, 1989, the judge freed the leaders under the bail
provision of the Argentine Criminal Code.319 The actions of Judge
Larrambebere illustrate the possible abuses judges may commit under article
213 bis. The PO leaders could have been held as long as six months before
they were sentenced and were thus able to petition a further judicial review
of the detention order.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Judicial Oversight of State of Siege Declarations
Judicial control of executive action taken pursuant to state of siege powers
is critical to the protection of human rights in Argentina. Recent military
governments have frequently employed the state of siege. Constitutionally
elected civilian governments have relied on the state of siege to a lesser extent,
but with regularity. During these occasions the judiciary has been unable to
guarantee human rights in any form.
Article 4 of the Habeas Corpus Act attempts to resolve any ambiguity
concerning the role of the judiciary during a state of siege. Nonetheless, court
decisions applying article 4 leave major constitutional issues unresolved. The
following four constitutional and legislative actions are necessary to increase
habeas corpus protections during a state of siege.
317. See Decision of Judge Gerardo Felipe Larrambebere, Cdmara de Instrucci6n Criminal del Corte
Federal de Mor6n, June 5, 1989 (unpublished decision on file with author) [hereinafter PO Decision].
318. Interview with Juan Carlos Capurro, Legal Advisor to Partido Obrero (June 14, 1989) (on file
with author). Capurro maintained that the measures urged by the pamphlet are traditional means of social
protest in Argentina. Id.
319. PO Decision, supra note 317, at 10-11.
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First, article 23 of the Argentine Constitution should be amended to
distinguish clearly between states of siege declared in response to foreign
attack and those declared because of internal disorder. A state of siege declared
for reason of internal disorder should be constitutionally limited to thirty days.
Article 23 should limit the suspension of constitutional rights during such time
to those constitutional rights directly and specifically related to the cause of
the internal disorder.2 Second, article 4, clause 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act
should be amended to explicitly provide for review of the reasonableness of
executive detentions during a state of siege, assigning the burden of proof to
the executive to establish the reasonable.relation between the detention and the
causes of the state of siege. Third, article 18 of the Constitution should be
amended to specifically recognize the right of habeas corpus. Finally, Law
16.986, the law regulating amparo, should be amended to expressly allow
persons to challenge regulations that unconstitutionally restrict procedures
designed to protect constitutional rights, including liberty.
1. Article 23 Reform
The Argentine Constitution currently allows the executive to exercise its
power of detention only after declaring a state of siege. In the case of internal
disorder, the state of siege must be declared by Congress if that body is in
session and must be approved by Congress if declared by the president while
Congress is in recess.
In the two most recent states of siege declared by constitutionally elected
governments, the executive exercised the power of article 23 detentions outside
those constitutional restraints. In 1985, the executive ordered detentions
without declaring a state of siege."' In 1989, the executive declared a state
of siege and ordered executive detentions while Congress was in session.322
In both instances, the executive justified these apparently extra-constitutional
acts on the theory that they were inherent in the executive's emergency pow-
ers. As a result, the constitutional authority of the president to order executive
detentions outside the provisions of articles 23, 67 and 86 is not clear.
320. This suggestion does not imply that all constitutional rights should be suspended during a state
of siege declared in response to foreign attack. International law establishes that certain rights such as the
rights to life, freedom from torture and slavery, and freedom of religion shall not be suspended even during
states of emergency. Article4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976).
321. See Osvaldo Antinori, 1986-A L.L. 141 (1986); Jorge Vago, 1986-A L.L. 144 (1986); Radl
Rivanera Carl s, 1986-A L.L. 147 (1986); Horacio Daniel Rodriguez, 1985-E L.L. 292 (1985); Pascual
Oscar Guerrieri, 1986-A L.L. 151 (1986). See also supra note 231 and accompanying text.
322. Pettigiani Decision, supra note 257.
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Various Argentine provincial constitutions have provided for a state of
emergency in addition to a state of siege.3" Recent proposals for the reform
of article 23 of the current Argentine Constitution suggest the inclusion of a
state of emergency provision and allow executive detentions without the
declaration of a state of siege. 4 The Council for the Consolidation of De-
mocracy suggests replacing article 23 with three separate articles. 3a The first
article would provide for the suspension of constitutional rights in the event
of exterior attack. The second article would provide for the suspension of
constitutional rights in the case of internal disorder. If Congress were in
session, only it would be able to declare the suspension. While in recess,
Congress would have to convene and approve a suspension declared by the
e:ecutive. According to this proposal, the power to detain individuals must be
reasonably related to a need to forestall or restrain the emergency, should not
amount to the application of a conviction or penalty, and must include the right
of option to leave the country. Finally, the third article would allow the
executive, with the advice of his or her ministers, to declare a state of preven-
tion and alarm similar to that provided in article 34 of the Constitution of
1949. The state of prevention and alarm would be declired for thirty days,
could not be reintroduced within one calendar year and would allow for
judicial detentions while leaving other constitutional guarantees in place. 6
These proposals assume that if the executive could declare a state of
emergency and exercise the power of detention for a limited time, there would
be a lesser need to resort to the more restrictive state of siege provision. 27
The vast majority of the states of siege declared in Argentina are not the result
of foreign attack.328 If the executive had the ability to detain individuals
during a state of emergency without resorting to the state of siege, all
nonambulatory constitutional guarantees could remain in place during periods
of relatively less severe instability.
In summary, foreign attack and internal disorder are basically different
situations and require different treatment. A provision allowing for the declara-
323. See, e.g., ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION supra note 37, at art. 34 (1949) (allowing declaration of
state of emergency in addition to state of siege); Id. at art. 86 (1853) (allowing executive to declare state
of emergency that would lapse in 10 days if not approved by Congress); Id. at art 18 (1949, repealed 1957)
(allowing president to declare "state of prevention and alarm" during which individuals could be detained
for 30 days without calling of state of siege).
324. Morello & Loft, supra note 272, at 623-25. Morrello and Loft suggest a legislative solution to
the state of emergency question. They urge passage of a law that would allow the president to declare a
state of emergency for 30 days in circumstances similar to that required by the, Constitution of 1949.
325. See REFORMA CONSTITUCiONAL I, supra note 20, at 305-06.
326. Id. at 306.
327. Id.
328. In 1865, during a war with Paraguay, a state of siege was declared in response to a foreign
attack. All other Argentine states of siege have been declared in response to internal disorder. REFORMA
CONST1TUCIONAL I, supra note 20, at 304.
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tion of a state of siege in the case of internal disorder must be narrowly drawn;
it should be invoked solely by the Congress when in session and should be
limited constitutionally to thirty days. In addition, the amendment should allow
the suspension of only those fights directly related to the causes of the state
of siege. While a state of emergency provision of the type proposed by
Morello-Lofi and the Council may reduce the instances in which a full state
of siege is called, such a provision runs the risk of creating yet another
mechanism by which civil rights may be easily suspended. The proposed
provision for states of siege during periods of internal disorder is sufficient to
address the need of the executive to suspend constitutional rights during times
of emergency. Any constitutional reform should not expand the ability of the
executive to detain individuals during a state of emergency.
2. The Reasonable Relation Standard of Review
The ambiguity surrounding the reasonable relation standard of the Habeas
Corpus Act stems from a conflict among Supreme Court decisions from the
past decade. In Zamorano, Timerman and Moya, the Supreme Court estab-
lished that the executive must provide the judiciary with reports detailed
enough to allow the court to make an informed decision concerning the reason-
ableness of the detention.329 In cases such as Tizio and Perelmuter, on the
other hand, the Supreme Court held that the judiciary must yield to executive
assertions that the detained individual was engaged in conduct related to the
cause of the state of siege.330
The cases that have been decided pursuant to the Habeas Corpus Act have
done little to clarify this important issue. In the Granada case, the Supreme
Court, apparently adopting the Tizio/Perelmuter standard, found that "the
Executive does not need to judicially establish the bases of the decision that
motivated the arrest."33' The Granada dissent, however, found that the exec-
utive had a duty to provide the court with sufficient information concerning
the causes that gave rise to the detention in question. In decisions since
Granada, courts have applied standards ranging from the permissive "clearly
unreasonable" test to the stricter standard proposed by the Granada
dissent.332
329. For a discussion of Zamorano, 7imerman and Moya, see supra notes 107-46 and accompanying
text.
330. For a discussion of 7Tzio and Perelmuter, see supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
331. For a discussion of Granada, see supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 281-91 and accompanying text.
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The article 4, clause 2 examination of reasonable relation needs to be
clarified.333 The position adopted by the Supreme Court in Granada is overly
permissive and would result in the same ineffectiveness that plagued the habeas
corpus procedure during the years of the military dictatorship, when the
executive merely had to assert that a detention was linked to the causes of a
state of siege. This standard, established during the dictatorship, reduces a
judge's role to verifying whether the executive has in fact made this assertion.
Conversely, if the judiciary follows the view of the Granada dissent, the
executive would need to provide detailed information regarding the relation
of the detention to the state of siege so that the judiciary could make an
informed decision regarding its reasonableness.
The detained individual should also be allowed to present evidence in
accordance with articles 14 and 15 of the Habeas Corpus Act. Finally, the
habeas corpus judge should be required to make an explicit ruling concerning
the evidence and reasonableness of the relation between the arrest and the
causes of the state of siege.
3. Unconstitutional Regulation of Habeas Corpus
The Habeas Corpus Act consolidated habeas corpus as a constitutionally
based procedure but did not provide protection from restrictive regulations in
the future. First, the Act does not prevent the reapplication of the restrictions
placed on habeas corpus during the period 1976-1983. 334 Second, because
habeas corpus is not constitutionally entrenched, a future repressive govern-
ment could repeal the Act and completely negate the use of habeas corpus
procedure to challenge unconstitutional detentions.
As the law now stands, there are several ways in which unconstitutional
regulations on habeas corpus could be controlled. The Habeas Corpus Act
allows judges hearing habeas corpus petitions to question the constitutionality
of laws permitting detentions. Article 6 expressly permits the judiciary to
declare de office the unconstitutionality of a deprivation of liberty if a law is
333. N. SAGOtS, HABEAS coRpus, supra note 8, at 263-64. Sagiis proposes a clarification that adopts
parts of the majority and minority positions in Granada. The Sagfid6s proposal would establish a flexible
period (approximately 30 days) during which time the courts would accept executive assertions that a
detainee is being held for reasons related to the state of siege. Under the proposal, only a claim of mistake
of person would require a court hearing a habeas corpus petition to accept offered evidence. At the end
of the period, the detainee would be allowed to bring a second habeas corpus petition to challenge the
reasonableness of the detention, and the executive would be required to prove the claimed connection
between the detention and the state of siege. The Sagtis proposal does not require the executive to establish
that the detainee committed a crime or is guilty in connection with some aspect of the state of siege. This
30 day extra-judicial detention period exceeds all international standards for these types of detentions.
334. For a discussion of the restrictions placed on habeas corpus during the most recent military
regime, see supra Sections II.A.2-3.
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contrary to the Constitution.3 ' The appeal of extraordinary recourse and the
process of amparo could also be used to challenge restrictions on habeas
corpus. Under Argentine law, the appeal of extraordinary recourse is a method
to challenge the constitutionality of a lower court decision before the Supreme
Court.336 If a lower court rejected a petition of habeas corpus applying a
restrictive habeas corpus regulation, the petitioner could bring an appeal of
extraordinary recourse to challenge the constitutionality of the regulation.
An amparo action challenging restrictions on the habeas corpus process
would be more difficult. Amparo generally provides a recourse against uncon-
stitutional administrative actions, not a method of challenging the constitution-
ality of regulations. The law regulating amparo specifically excludes limitations
on liberty from the scope of the recourse.337 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
has held that under certain circumstances the process of amparo may be used
to challenge the constitutionality of regulations. 3 While amparo does not
apply to unconstitutional restrictions on liberty, it may possibly be invoked to
challenge unconstitutional restrictions on the quasi-constitutional process of
habeas corpus. The law regulating amparo must be amended to expressly allow
for the challenging of regulations that unconstitutionally restrict procedures de-
signed to protect constitutional rights.
However, these protections are insufficient to prevent attack by an extra-
constitutional regime. While no strictly legal provision is an absolute guarantee
against abuse, a declaration that habeas corpus is an inalienable right of
detained persons must be included in the Constitution.3 9
335. Habeas Corpus Act, at art. 6.
336. For a discussion of extraordinary recourse, see N. SAGO S, RECURSo EXTRAORDINARIO (1984).
337. For a discussion of the recourse of amparo, see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
338. In Carlos Outon, 267 Fallos 215 (1967), and Sanchez Sorondo, 270 Fallos 289 (1968), the
Argentine Supreme Court allowed petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of laws. In these cases, the
Court found that the purpose of the amparo regulating law must have been to facilitate the ability of citizens
to challenge laws that limited constitutional rights in an arbitrary and manifestly unconstitutional manner.
For a discussion of Outon and Sorondo, see Feinrider, supra note 26, at 192-93.
339. The Council for the Consolidation of Democracy has proposed reform of article 18 to include
a prohibition against all restrictions to ambulatory liberty. REFORMA CONsTITUCIONAL I, supra note 20,
at 280-81. The proposed reform of article 18, in relevant part, is as follows:
[n]o one shall ble arrested or restrained in any form in their ambulatory liberty, except in virtue
of a well-founded judicial order. A restriction without a previous order will only be valid when
there exists certain risk that ajudicial order may not be obtained in time and a condition in which
exist certain suspicions and some indication of guilt.
Id. at 280-81. These reforms do not go far enough. They do not include an express statement guaranteeing
the right of habeas corpus (or similar writs of extraordinary recourse). Any future reform ofarticle 18 must
expressly recognize the habeas corpus right.
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B. Effectiveness of Habeas Corpus Procedures
The following changes to the Habeas Corpus Act are necessary to improve
the effectiveness of habeas corpus procedures in protecting against disappear-
ances and illegal detentions. First, the Act's coverage should not depend on
whether the detention or threat of detention is officially sanctioned but on
whether the individual authorizing such an act appears cloaked with govern-
mental authority. Second, the Act's coverage should also include judicially-
ordered detentions if those detentions are ordered by a judge as prosecutor and
involve crimes that are defined by membership in or adherence to the beliefs
of a political organization. Third, the Act should establish the failure to
cooperate with habeas corpus procedure as a criminal offense punishable by
imprisonment and large fines. Fourth, the Act should clearly establish judicial
authority over security forces and other governmental agencies during investi-
gations of habeas corpus petitions.
1. Coverage of Individual Acts
The Habeas Corpus Act made important advances in the scope of habeas
corpus procedure. The Act extended the reach of habeas corpus to cover the
threat of illegal detention and the worsening of conditions of legitimate
detention. This widening of scope was responsible for the largest number of
habeas corpus petitions during the five years following the Act's passage. The
Act did not'resolve, however, whether the acts of individuals who do not
represent a public authority are covered, leaving the question to be decided
under provincial law.
The Habeas Corpus Act allows for the filing of a habeas corpus petition
when the petitioner has only minimal information about the detainers. Supreme
Court jurisprudence establishes that the judiciary has a duty to fully investigate
the source of such detentions. However, the Act does not clarify whether
habeas corpus procedure will apply once it is shown that a private individual
is responsible for the detention. Experience during the dictatorship makes this
issue important. Paramilitary groups with possible, but unestablished, ties to
the military were often involved in the sequestering of individuals. During the
dictatorship, innumerable habeas corpus petitions were rejected because of the
lack of a detention by a public authority. The criminal provision applying to
the illegal deprivation of liberty was also found to be inadequate to combat
disappearances at the hands of paramilitary groups.
Given this history, the Habeas Corpus Act must be clarified to specifically
include acts by private individuals. Numerous provinces currently allow the
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procedure of habeas corpus to be applied to the actions of individuals.4 ° The
Act's application to the federal capital and the federal territories should
similarly be expanded to include the acts of private individuals.
2. Coverage of Judicially Ordered Detentions
The Habeas Corpus Act should apply to those detentions ordered by a
judge acting as prosecutor, those authorized by certain provisions of the
Argentine Criminal Code, such as article 213 bis, and those involving crimes
that are defined by membership in or adherence to the beliefs of an organiza-
tion. 34 1
Judges have the power to order extended periods of detention for ideo-
logically based crimes without the protection of habeas corpus. Because judges
are considered "competent authorities," the constitutionality of these detentions
may not be challenged through the habeas corpus procedure. Courts allow
habeas corpus petitions against judicially ordered detentions only in special
circumstances. 42 The appellate courts should have jurisdiction over this type
of petition. This expansion of coverage would allow protection against arbitrary
detentions regardless of their source.
3. Control of Noncompliance
The Habeas Corpus Act should be amended to make noncompliance with
the habeas corpus procedure a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment
and large fines to severely sanction officials who violate their legal duties. The
Act does not adequately address the problem of noncompliance. It simplifies
the complex system of sanctions against officials who do not cooperate with
the habeas corpus process by creating a single sanctions article that is much
less specific and less rigorous than former provisions. While the Act establish-
es that it is the duty of the security organizations to comply effectively with
the habeas corpus process, violation of this duty is not defined as a criminal
offense, nor are any other serious sanctions attached to such violations. To
prevent illegal detentions by governments through the habeas corpus process,
340. The provinces that allow actions of individuals to be challenged through the process of habeas
corpus include Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Chaco, Entre Rios, Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, Neuquen, Rfo
Negro, Salta, San Luis and Santiago de Estero. See FuNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2036. See also N.
SAGOtS, HABEAS coapus, supra note 8, at 140-41. Senator Martianrena, when introducing the compromise,
specifically stated that the scope of the habeas corpus law for the federal capital would be left to subsequent
regulation. FUNDAMENTOS, supra note 38, at 2047.
341. These statutes can be distinguished from the statutes covering conspiracy or illicit association
by intent. In the latter, the individuals involved must have intended to perpetrate another defined crime.
342. N. SAGOs, HABEAS CORPUS, supra note 8, at 165-67.
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noncompliance by the executive or the security forces must be established as
criminal behavior, thus meriting serious punishment.
4. Judicial Authority During Investigations
While it is true that civilian judges are basically powerless when con-
fronting a noncooperative military, judges could better assert investigative
authority if such authority was guaranteed in the Habeas Corpus Act. The Act
should grant judges the power to summon military personnel to testify in the
oral proceeding, empower investigating judges to visit and inspect any and all
military or police detention centers, and give judges the power to subpoena
all data concerning the detainee, regardless of the security rating of that data.
5. Data on Detainees
During the dictatorship, the military maintained extensive files that included
information on a wide range of possibly "subversive" individuals.343 These
individuals were observed and marked for possible detentions. Once individuals
were detained, the military kept records that tracked their detentions and
eventual "transfers." When habeas corpus petitions were filed for these individ-
uals, the security forces invariably informed the habeas corpus magistrate that
the person was not being detained and the military had no information concern-
ing the individual.
Since 1983, there have been several studies and a legislative proposal
concerning the protection and right of access to personal data files maintained
by governmental agencies.3" The legislative proposal, completed in 1986,
included an article that provided for a petition of "habeas data."345 The habe-
as data petition process would allow a person to obtain access to his or her
files and to challenge any misrepresentation of fact contained therein.346 The
proposed process would also be subject to certain restrictions in the context
of defense or public security matters.347
The new habeas data proposal would be an important addition to the
existing protections guarding against illegal detentions. A streamlined process
providing petitioners with information about a given individual compiled by
the security forces would greatly assist in determining whether disappearances
343. Cf. NUNCA MAS, supra note 1, at 16-18.
344. See, e.g., Subsecretaria de informitica y desarollo, Legislaci6n sabre protecci6n de datos
personales, DOCuMENTos SID No. 10 (Argentina) (1986) [hereinafter Habeas Data Project]. See also C.
CORREA, DERECHO wnEORMATICO 241-77 (1987).
345. Habeas Data Project, supra note 344, at 6.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 5.
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were related to the government or the security forces. However, the problem
of military noncooperation would also apply to habeas data. Unlike article 5
of the Habeas Corpus Act, the proposed right of access would only be exercis-
able by the individual and not by any other person acting on the individual's
behalf. The legislative proposal was based on the right of privacy articulated
in the Argentine Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
information contained in government files is considered private and therefore
accessible only to the subject individuals24
Nevertheless, a habeas data variation could be fashioned to allow petitions
asserting the right of access to files on behalf of a disappeared person if a
certain threshold showing was met. For example, a petition could be granted
where the petitioner: 1) asserted the right of access on behalf of another
individual; 2) made a showing that the individual had disappeared; 3) presented
evidence that the disappearance was related to the security forces or other
government officials; and 4) simultaneously submitted a petition of habeas
corpus on behalf of the individual. A sanctions provision similar to that of
article 24 of the Habeas Corpus Act would further deter abuse by petitioners.
This evidentiary showing and the threat of sanctions would maintain the
personal right of privacy while still allowing the right of access to be asserted
for the disappeared. Strict sanctions could also be attached to the failure of
officials to cooperate with the habeas data process. This latter change is
necessary to assure military cooperation.
6. Ombudsman or Defensor del Pueblo
As discussed above, article 21 of the Habeas Corpus Act provides for the
intervention of the public prosecutor in the habeas corpus procedure. The Act
envisions the role of the public prosecutor in the process of habeas corpus not
as a defender of the authority responsible for the challenged injury, but as a
"controller of legality." '349 In that role, the public prosecutor is meant to
fulfill the important duty of ensuring constitutional order. The public prosecu-
tor should adequately protect article 18 rights independent from the executive,
judiciary or legislature. However, the institution of the public prosecutor in
Argentina is too closely tied to the executive to effectively carry out these
duties. The public prosecutor, while considered a semi-independent judicial
official, is appointed by the Ministry of Justice, which is under the control of
the executive.
348. Id. at 1.
349. FUNDAMEwNToS, supra note 38, at 2031-32.
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Some countries have created the position of ombudsman or defensor del
pueblo to supplement the role of the public prosecutor as a controller of
legality.35 For example, in the Scandinavian countries, the institution of the
ombudsman was created as a position independent of the executive that would
ensure executive compliance with guarantees of individual freedom."' In the
Spanish Constitution of 1978, the role of defensbr del pueblo was similarly
created to supervise the activity of the executive and defend constitutional
rights.352 A number of Latin American countries have also created such
positions to provide for an independent monitor of constitutional rights."
A number of legislative initiatives both before and after the past military
dictatorship have proposed the creation of an ombudsman or defensor del
pueblo in Argentina."' The most recent proposal would create a defensor
delpueblo charged with controlling and supervising the administrative entities
of the executive.355 The defensor del pueblo would be elected by both houses
of the Argentine Congress for a term of four years and would be eligible for
a single reelection. In order to complete the mission of the office, the proposal
grants the defensor del pueblo the power to subpoena official and executive
reports and/or testimony concerning topics under investigation, to examine any
site under the control of the government, and to examine all documentation,
including information classified as "secret" or "reserved."356 If the defensor
del pueblo encounters constitutional violations, the legislation empowers the
defensor del pueblo to bring criminal charges through the office of the public
prosecutor, solicit the application of sanctions against the public authorities,
350. H. FIX-ZAMUDIo, supra note 38, at 281-344.
351. Id. at 284-92.
352. CoNsTrrucI6N EspAtROLA art. 54 (Spain). See also H. FIX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 38, at 329-36;
F. MURILLOFERROL&M. RAMIREZJwMENEZ, ORDENA mNTOCONSTITUTIONALDEESPAfJA64-65 (1980).
353. H. Fix-ZAMUDIO, supra note 38, at 336-43. Fix-Zamudio discusses the creation or proposed
creation of the institution of ombudsman or defensor del pueblo in Mexico, Costa Rica and Venezuela.
See also Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, Expectations Denied: Habeas Corpus
and the Search for Guatemala's Disappeared 45-49 (1988) (on file with author). The Committee report
discusses the creation and performance of the institution of Human Rights Procurator in Guatemala.
354. A proposal to create the institution of ombudsman in Argentina based on a study by Prof. Miguel
M. Padilla was submitted to the House of Deputies in 1975, but the proposal was abandoned when the
military came to power in 1976. H. FIX-ZAMUDIO, supra note 38, at 339. On May 18; 1988, Rep. Jorge
R. Vanossi again introduced in the House of Deputies a bill that would create a defensor del pueblo in
Argentina. The bill was assigned to the Commission of Constitutional Matters and has not advanced to
legislative consideration. Diario de sesiones, CAmara de diputados de la naci6n, 100 Reuni6n, 30 Sesi6n
Ordinaria, at 65-68 (1988) [hereinafterDefensorProject]. The Council for the Consolidation of Democracy,
in its proposal of constitutional reform, enumerated some potential difficulties with the creation of the
institution of ombudsman. REFORMA CONSTITUCiONAL 1I, supra note 32, at 119-20. The Council for the
Consolidation of Democracy later made several recommendations that addressed some of these difficulties.
Consejo para la consolidaci6n de la democracia, Incorpaci6n de la instituci6n del ombudsman - defensor
del pueblo - en la Republica Argentina, Doc. No. 284 (Buenos Aires, 1987) (on file with author).
355. Defensor Project, supra note 354, at art. 1.
356. Id. at art. 16.
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formulate recommendations for reforms of administrative procedures, and
propose the adoption of legal norms controlling certain unconstitutional be-
357havior.35
The office of defensor delpueblo could play an important supplemental role
in the process of habeas corpus in Argentina. As the proposed position would
be primarily responsible for monitoring organizations of national administra-
tion, it is not clear what control the defensor del pueblo would have over
security forces or intelligence gathering organizations of the executive. If
empowered to review and inspect locations and documents of the security
forces, the defensor del pueblo could serve as an additional investigator for
habeas corpus petitions. In addition to the investigative power of the habeas
corpus magistrate, the defensor delpueblo could act to ensure that the security
forces were providing all the information they possessed concerning disap-
peared individuals. With these powers, the defensor del pueblo in Argentina
could fulfill an important role in the protection of the right to liberty.
V. CONCLUSION
The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the key procedure
protecting human rights. It has been called the law most feared and hated by
dictators. In the darkest moments of Argentine history, however, habeas corpus
failed to ensure the most basic right of liberty. This failure resulted in the
continuation of thousands of illegal detentions, acts of torture, and summary
and arbitrary executions, resulting in untold human suffering.
If the process of habeas corpus -- the rule of law -- cannot protect citizens
against arbitrary and capricious detentions by the very government that is
meant to represent the rule of law, then the reason for the existence of govern-
ment is no longer valid, and anarchy may present a more benign societal
arrangement. Some suggest that habeas corpus and the rule of law will never
be adequate to confront those who rule from a position of both constitutional
illegality and absolute power. Nonetheless, society continues to turn to the rule
of law as the best and most equitable path available for the protection of basic
human rights and human dignity. In this context, governments and peoples
must strive to find more effective means to protect basic rights and dignities
even, perhaps especially, during times of unconstitutional, illegitimate govern-
ments.
In the six years since the return to civilian government in Argentina, the
Argentine judiciary, legislature and executive have taken steps to confront the
failure of habeas corpus during the time of the dictatorship and the tragic
357. Id. at art. 18.
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consequences of that failure in terms of human suffering. The Habeas Corpus
Act of 1984, sought to reform important aspects of the habeas corpus process,
including judicial control of executive action during a state of siege. The
judiciary actually applied that law to provide a degree of protection against
arbitrary arrests during two states of siege. However, present habeas corpus
procedures are not effective in controlling the executive's state of siege power
or forcing compliance by noncooperative or illegitimate regimes. The Act's
scope is also too narrow and the investigatory power of habeas corpus magis-
trates too small. Despite the reform efforts, the overwhelming failure of habeas
corpus during the period of military rule from 1976 to 1983 in Argentina
remains unresolved. The issues presented in this article must be brought to the
forefront of debate and must be adequately resolved for the process of habeas
corpus to protect the right of liberty in Argentina.
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Appendix
Law 23.098
(Habeas Corpus Act of 1984)
CHAPTER I: GENERAL DISPOsITIONS
Article 1. Applicability of the Law. This law will be effective from the date of its publication. The
first chapter shall apply in every court in the Nation. It shall not obstruct the application of provincial
constitutions or laws enacted pursuant to them, when those constitutions and laws grant more efficient
protection of the rights to which this law refers.
Article 2. Jurisdiction of Application. This law shall apply in either national or provincial courts,
according to whether the act denounced as injurious emanates from a national or provincial authority.
When the injurious act is by an individual, the jurisdiction shall be that established by the law violated.
If a party is initially unaware of the authority from which the act denounced as injurious emanated,
any court may hear the petition, according to the rules regulating its territorial competence, until it is
determined, under the previous paragraph, which court has jurisdiction.
Article 3. Procedure. The procedure of habeas corpus shall apply when a party denounces an act
or omission of a public authority that implicates:
1. A limitation or present threat to ambulatory liberty without a written order from a competent
authority; or,
2. An illegitimate aggravation of the form and conditions under which one is detained, irrespec-
tive of the legitimacy of that detention.
Article 4. State of Siege. When the liberty of a person is limited by virtue of the declaration
provided for by article 23 of the National Constitution, the process of habeas corpus has the authority
to verify, in the concrete case:
1. The legitimacy of the declaration of the state of siege;
2. The correlation between the order of deprivation of liberty and the situation that gave rise to
the declaration of the state of siege;
3. The illegitimate aggravation of the forms and conditions under which one is deprived of
liberty, which in no case can take place in centers where sentences are served;
4. The effective exercise of the right of option provided for in the last part of article 23 of the
National Constitution.
Article 5. Standing to Bring a Petition. The petition of habeas corpus may be brought by any person
who affirms that they find themselves in the conditions described by articles 3 and 4 or by any other
person in their favor.
Article 6. Unconstitutionality. The judiciary may declare the unconstitutionality of the deprivation
of liberty in any particular case, when the deprivation is made by an authority pursuant to a written order
based on a law that is contrary to the National Constitution.
Article 7. Recourse of Unconstitutionality. The sentences dictated by superior courts in deciding
habeas corpus petitions shall be considered conclusive for the purpose of a claim of unconstitutionality
before the Supreme Court. Recourse shall proceed in the cases and forms provided by the laws in effect.
CHAPTER II: PROCEDURE
Article 8. Competence. When the act denounced as injurious emanates from a national authority,
the following shall hear the habeas corpus petition:
1. In the Federal capital the judges of first instance in the criminal division.
2. In the national territory of the provinces the section judges, according to the rules that regulate
their territorial competence.
Article 9. Petition. The petition of habeas corpus should contain:
1. Name and address of the petitioner;
2. Name, address and other personal facts known of the person for whom the petition is made;
3. The authority from which emanated the act denounced as injurious;
4. Cause or pretext of the act denounced as injurious to the best of petitioner's knowledge;
5. Statement of how the act is illegitimate.
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If the petitioner is unaware of some of the requisites contained in nos. 2, 3, and 4 the petition shall
furnish the facts that would best lead to their ascertainment.
The petition may be presented at any hour of the day in writing or in oral testimony before the clerk
of court. In either case, the identity of the petitioner shall be immediately confirmed, and when this is
not possible without prejudice to the petition, the court may take the steps necessary to do so.
Article 10. Dismissal or Incompetence. The judge shall dismiss a petition that does not refer to one
of the conditions established in articles 3 and 4 of this law. If the judge considers himself or herself to
be without jurisdiction, the judge shall so declare.
In either case, the resolution shall be sent immediately for consultation to the Court of Appeals,
which shall decide the appeal within twenty-four hours. If the Court confirms the resolution of incompe-
tence, the Court shall send the writ to the judge the Court considers competent.
When the judge of first instance has his seat in a different location than the Court of Appeals, the
judge shall send the complete testimony by the quickest method possible. If the Court of Appeals reverses
the resolution of incompetence, the Court shall notify the judge by telegram of the decision and order.
the judge to continue the proceeding immediately.
The judge shall not dismiss a petition for defects in form, but shall immediately provide the
necessary measures for their correction, without prejudice of the corresponding sanctions (article 24).
Article 11. Writ of Habeas Corpus. When the petition concerns the deprivation of liberty, the judge
shall immediately order the named authority to bring before the judge the detained individual with a
report of the grounds for the detention, the form and conditions of the detention if by written order from
a competent authority, in which case the detaining authority should bring the order, and if the detained
individual has been turned over to another authority, to whom, for what reason, and in what manner
the transfer was made.
When the petition concerns a present threat of deprivation of liberty of a person, the judge shall
order the named authority to present the report referred to in the proceeding paragraph. If the authority
that has detained the person deprived of their liberty or from which has emanated the act denounced as
injurious ignores the order, the judge shall deliver the order to the superior of the government branch
indicated by the petition.
The order shall be sent in writing and with the date and hour, unless the judge considers it necessary
to appear personally in the place where the detained individual is being held, in which case the judge
may give the order orally, but shall leave proof of having done so.
When the court or judge of competent jurisdiction has knowledge by satisfactory proof that a person
is being maintained in custody, detention or confinement by an administrative, police or military
functionary within the court's jurisdiction, and the judge fears that the detained individual will be
transported outside the territory of the court's jurisdiction, or that the detained individual will suffer
irreparable harm before he or she could be aided by a writ of habeas corpus, the judge may issue the
writ de office, ordering the person carrying out the detention, or any commissioner, police agent, or
other employee, to bring the detained or threatened individual to the judge's presence to resolve the
situation according to the law.
Article 12. Answering the Writ. The named authority shall comply with the writ immediately, or
within the period that the judge determines, in accordance with the circumstances of the case.
If due to a physical impediment the detained individual cannot be brought to the presence of the
judge, the named authority shall present within the same period a report on the cause that impedes
compliance with the order, estimating the time within which it will be possible to comply with the order.
The judge shall expressly rule on the question of the protection of the detainee. The judge may visit the
place where the individual is detained if the judge believes it necessary to observe the situation, and may
authorize a family member or a person of confidence to observe the situation of the detained individual.
From the effective date of the order the detained individual shall remain at the disposition of the
judge who gave the order until the completion of the procedure.
Article 13. Summons to the Hearing. The Order shall provide the named authority a summons to
the hearing provided for by the following article, at which time the authority may appear by representa-
tion of a duly authorized functionary, with the right of legal representation.
When the affected individual has not been deprived of his or her liberty the judge shall immediately
summon the individual for the hearing provided for in the following article, informing the individual
that, in his or her absence, the individual shall be represented by the public defender.
The affected individual may name a defense attorney or exercise the defense pro se, so long as it
does not prejudice the efficacy of the defense, in which case the public defender shall be named as
defense attorney.
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In the procedure of habeas corpus there shall be no recusal, but the moment that a judge feels
incompetent for reason of partiality the judge shall declare it, ordering that the hearing be completed
before the next judge of turn or before that judge's legal assistant.
Article 14. Oral Hearing. The hearing shall take place in the presence of the cited individuals who
make appearances. The individual who has been deprived of his or her liberty shall always be present.
The presence of the public defender shall be obligatory in the situation described by paragraphs 2 ahd
3 of article 13.
The hearing shall begin with the reading of the petition and the report. Then the judge shall question
the petitioner and question such others as the judge may order. The judge shall give the named authority
and the petitioner the opportunity to testify either personally or with the assistance of an attorney.
Article 15. Evidence. If de office or by petition of one of the parties the judge believes it necessary
to admit evidence, the judge shall determine its admissibility according to its probative value and
relevance to the case at hand. The evidence shall be admitted at the time of the hearing, or, if not
possible, the judge shall order the evidence produced and the hearing continued within twenty-four hours.
At the close of the admission of evidence the judge shall hear the testimony of the parties as
provided for by the previous paragraph.
Article 16. Transcript of the Hearing. The clerk of court shall maintain a transcript of the hearing
provided for by articles 14 and 15,,which shall contain:
1. The names of the judge and the parties.
2. An account of the various parts of the hearing, with an indication of the names and addresses
of the attending experts, interpreters or witnesses.
3. If there was an offer of evidence, a brief summary of what was admitted or excluded, 'and
why.
4. If the parties so request, a summary of the substantive part of the petition or pronouncement
of what was taken into account.
5. The day and hour of the hearing, the signatures of the judge and clerk, and of parties that wish
to sign it.
Article 17. Decision. At the termination of the hearing the judge shall immediately issue a decision,
which shall contain:
1. The day and hour of the decision.
2. An account of the act denounced as injurious, of the authority from which it emanated, and
the name of the person who suffered from the act.
3. The reasoning of the decision.
4. The resolution, which should discuss the dismissal or granting of the petition. If the latter,
the resolution shall order the immediate freedom or the cessation of the injurious act.
5. Costs and sanctions according to articles 23 and 24.
6. The signature of the judge.
If the judge has knowledge of the probable commission of a crime of public action, the judge shall
order the corresponding testimony delivered to the Public Prosecutor.
Article 18. Pronouncement. The decision shall immediately be read by the judge before the parties
and shall be posted in case some of the parties are not present. The public defender, if required to be
present pursuant to article 13, paragraphs 2 and 3, shall not leave until the reading of the decision.
Article 19. Recourse. An appeal of the decision to the Court of Appeals may be brought within
twenty-four hours, in writing or orally, before the Clerk of the Court.
The appeal may be brought by the injured individual, his or her lawyer, the named authority or
its representative, or the petitioner, only for sanctions or costs that impose hardship.
During the appeal the decision shall be suspended, except with respect to the liberty of the person
(article 17, clause 4), which shall remain in effect.
The Court of Appeals shall grant or deny the appeal in the case of a denied writ within twenty-four
hours. If the court grants the appeal it shall issue the summons provided for in the first paragraph of
the following article.
Article 20. Procedure of Appeal. Upon granting the appeal the parties shall be summoned by the
judge to appear within twenty-four hours before the superior court, placing the detained individual at
the superior court's disposition. If the Court of Appeals is located in a place other that the superior court,
the judge shall summon the parties to appear within a convenient time considering the distance.
Within the period of the summons the parties may establish the appeal and present writings on the
merits of the appeal or the decision.
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The Court of Appeals may order the renewal of the oral hearing provided for in articles 13, 14,
15, and 16, saving the inferior court from the errors or omissions which may have occurred before the
judge of first instance. The Court shall render the decision in accordance with the provisions of articles
17 and 18.
Article 21. Intervention of the Public Prosecutor. When the petition of habeas corpus is presented,
the Court shall notify the Public Prosecutor in writing or orally, in either case leaving proof of the act.
The Public Prosecutor will have all rights provided other parties, but it shall not be necessary to summon
or notify the Public Prosecutor at subsequent points.
The Public Prosecutor may appear at the instances that he or she believes to be proper and may
appeal the decisioi regardless of the outcome.
Article 22. Intervention of the Petitioner. The petitioner may intervene in the procedure with the
assistance of counsel and shall have all the rights provided to the other parties, except those set forth
in paragraph 2 of article 19, but it shall not be necessary to summon or notify the petitioner.
Article 23. Costs. When the decision grants the petition, the costs of the procedure shall be charged
to the functionary responsible for the injurious act, except in the case of article 6, where the costs shall
be borne by the party who incurred them.
When the petition is denied the costs shall be charged to the party who incurred them, except in
the case of manifest inappropriateness, in which case the costs shall be charged to the petitioner, or the
injured individual, or both jointly, according to whether the misconduct corresponds to the activity of
one or both together.
Article 24. Sanctions. If the petition is malicious due to omitted or false declarations the judge may
impose on the petitioner in the decision a fine of fifty to a thousand Argentine pesos or an arrest of
one to five days in the jail of the court, or in an establishment that the judge determines, according to
the degree of misconduct. The decision of sanctions may be deferred when it is necessary to conduct
investigations, in which case the appeal may be brought once the decision is announced, the notification
of which shall be in conformance with the first book, title VI of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The fine shall be executed in conformance with the provisions of the Penal Code, but the conversion
shall be 200 Argentine pesos for each day of arrest.
The judges and the functionaries which unjustifiably fail to comply with the time periods the law
provides shall be sanctioned with a fine determined according to the previous paragraph. The judge shall
apply the sanctions to named authorities or to judicial magistrates without prejudice to article 45 of the
National Constitution.
CHAPTER Im: LAWS OF APPLICATION
Article 25. Judicial Turn. To effect the procedure provided for in the present law, turns of
twenty-four hours shall govern in the Federal Capital, as determined by the Honorable National Court
of Appeals in the Criminal and Correctional Divisions.
In the national or provincial territory the same turns shall govern as determined by the respective
Court of Appeals, without the obligation of the judge and auxiliary functionaries to remain in court, but
in a place visible to the public shall be posted the particular judge of turn with respect to the rights of
intervention provided by article 9.
The turn of the day in the respective jurisdictions shall be published in the papers as well as posted
in advisories in a place visible to the public in the judicial and police buildings.
The Court of Appeals shall regulate the dispositions applicable to the other functionaries or
employees that should intervene or assist in the procedure.
Article 26. Security Organizations. The national authorities and the security organizations shall take
the steps necessary for effective compliance with the present law and shall place at the disposition of
the intervening court all their available resources for the fulfillment of the procedures that this law
provides.
Article 27. Register. The judiciary of the Nation shall report the sanctions imposed pursuant to
article 24 of this law to the Supreme Court, which shall organize them, through its Secretary, in a
register.
* In 1985 the Argentine peso was replaced by the austral, at a rate of one austral to 100 pesos and
approximately one U.S. dollar. As of Jan. 24, 1991, one austral had fallen in value to .0017 of a U.S.
dollar. Thus the fines provided in the Habeas Corpus Act are meaningless today.
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Article 28. Repeal. Article 20 of Law 48, Section II of the form book of Law 2371 (Criminal
Procedure Code) is hereby abolished.
Article 29. Notification of the Executive Branch.
